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 AN ESSAY ON CONTRACT AND STATUS: RACE,
 MARRIAGE, AND THE MERETRICIOUS SPOUSE
 Howard 0. Hunter*
 T HE notions of contract and status present one of the great
 paradoxes in Anglo-American jurisprudence: the two concepts
 are antithetical, yet they overlap significantly in those areas where
 private interests and public interests collide or coincide. The source
 of this antithesis is in the origins of the concepts. Contract emerges
 from private transactions, but status is publicly imposed. Examin-
 ing the overlap reveals the tendency of late twentieth century Amer-
 ican judges to intermingle contradictory legal concepts when faced
 with difficult social problems.
 Although other areas of the law exhibit such a tendency, cases
 dealing with problems involving race and marriage merit particular
 study for two reasons. First, both race and marriage have been part
 of the social fabric of America since the seventeenth century.' When
 the law deals with problems of such enduring complexity, the solu-
 tions reflect significant social, moral, and political forces.2 The
 study of cases under the rubric of "contract" that involve racial or
 marital issues thus assists in understanding significant changes in
 societal mores and standards. Contract traditionally has been
 viewed as the quintessential common law,3 and the degree to which
 the state interferes in this area of private law tends to reflect the
 currently prevailing attitude toward the importance of public law
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971, Yale
 University. The author wishes to express his appreciation to his student assistants, Jane L.
 Phillips, class of 1977, and William F. Rucker, class of 1978, Emory Law School, for their
 research assistance in the preparation of this paper.
 I See generally W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 136-67 (1968); E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN
 FAMILY 29-65 (1966).
 2 In retrospect, what one generation considers to be significant forces may seem to a later
 generation to have been transient concerns of the moment. This statement and the one in
 the text admittedly reflect training the author received in legal realism. For a somewhat
 different approach, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
 1 Modern American decisional law is often not strictly speaking "common law" in that
 decisions hinge on statutory interpretation rather than case-law precedent. Nonetheless,
 many general and reasonably vague statutory pronouncements have given rise to whole new
 areas of decisional law that, in context, might be characterized as a form of "common law."
 An antitrust lawyer, for instance, does not rely on the Sherman Act in advising his clients;
 rather, he looks to the decisional law that is in fact the substantive law in the area. For an
 interesting discussion of changing approaches to the common law and case law, see Gilmore,
 Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961).
 1039
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 in the ordering of society.4
 Second, rules relating to both race and marriage recently have
 been subjected to great pressures, requiring courts to reexamine
 older resolutions of the conflict between status and contract. Race
 has become almost as important in enforcing a "freedom" to con-
 tract (the result of which may be another form of status) as it once
 was in demarcating status, most notably that of slavery. Marriage,
 a traditional status, has seen some inroads from contract, but the
 more significant pressures on marriage have derived from transac-
 tions between unmarried couples who have a long term living ar-
 rangement. Before discussing these developments, however, delin-
 eation of a framework for understanding the current usage of
 "contract" and "status" is necessary.
 I. TOWARD A DEFINITIONAL FRAMEWORK
 A. The Concept of Promise
 From the time of the earliest social organizations, humans have
 been concerned with dividing work responsibilities and securing
 predictable behavior. Central to this concern has been the problem
 of promise.5 Rational creatures have an abstraction of the future and
 continually attempt to project the present into the future through
 the making of promises.6 Once promises are made, society needs
 some mechanism for their enforcement.7 Accepting that some de-
 I As one commentator recently observed, the common law, including that of "contract,"
 represents a compromise reflecting the desiderata of the day, with the caveat, however, that
 one day's desiderata may become the next day's rigid and obsolete rules. See Fridman, The
 Basis of Contractual Obligation: An Essay in Speculative Jurisprudence, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
 1, 22 (1974). Fridman basically was expanding the opinion expressed by Professor Ames 90
 years ago: "Nothing impresses the student of the Common Law more than its extraordinary
 conservatism." Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pt. 2), 2 HARv. L. REV. 53, 53 (1888). For
 more on this point, see W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 54, 126-29 (2d ed. 1972).
 For criticism of the study of contracts as being irrelevant to an understanding of the opera-
 tion of commerce in a technological, regulated society, see Mooney, Old Kontract Principles
 and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL.
 L. REV. 213, 220 (1966); The Relevance of Contract Theory: A Symposium, 1967 WIS. L. REV.
 803.
 1 Nietzsche characterized promise as the essential dilemma of rational man: "To breed an
 animal with the right to make promises-is not this the paradoxical problem nature has set
 itself with regard to man? And is it not man's true problem?" F. NIETZSCHE, THE GENEALOGY
 OF MORALS 189 (Anchor Books ed. 1956).
 1 See MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 696-712 (1974).
 MacNeil has suggested four primal roots of contract: (1) specialization of labor and exchange,
 (2) some freedom to choose, or at least a perception of choice, (3) a conscious awareness of
 past, present, and future, and (4) the social matrix, especially language. Id.
 I See id. at 783-90.
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 gree of stability and certainty is desirable in human relations, the
 person who hoes the beans wants to know that he can rely on the
 hunter to provide meat for dinner. Ants may be able to accomplish
 these tasks by genetic coding that directs their activities; humans,
 however, must find or create social means for accomplishing them.
 Contract is certainly not the only means for dealing with social
 organization, but the problem of promise is the basis for the devel-
 opment of contractual theory and law. As Professor Havighurst has
 said: "[W]e do not have promises because we have a law of con-
 tracts; we have a law of contracts because we have promises."'
 Havighurst was discussing volitional promises,9 but promise also
 may be imposed. The prevailing social structure or governing au-
 thority may create a public duty to do a certain act or to incur an
 obligation. This process requires both an abstraction of the future
 and an acceptance of the imposition of the duty. "Promise" as the
 word usually is understood is not a particularly artful description
 of acquiescence in the imposition of a public duty. Nevertheless, in
 the sense that an individual agrees to accept a public duty (admit-
 tedly, the acceptance may be coerced) and to perform the acts nec-
 essary to fulfill that duty, he has "promised" to perform a task or
 tasks and others may rely on this "promise" in the ordering and
 planning of their lives.'0
 Although the concept of promise is essential to a rational ordering
 of society, the selection of which promises are important enough to
 be imposed or enforced and the means of enforcement enable society
 to maintain stability and predictability. The theoretical constructs
 of status and contract help explain how promises have been selected
 and enforced. Movement between status and contract has indicated
 and facilitated significant social changes over the past several cen-
 turies. This movement has reflected, to a greater or lesser extent,
 evolving concepts of individual liberty and necessary community
 control.
 N H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 10 (1961). See generally Leff, Contract
 As Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 131, 138 (1970); Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58
 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 941-42 (1958).
 See H. HAVIGHURST, supra note 8, at 9-10.
 A duty of this sort also may be privately created. See text accompanying notes 38-56
 infra. That the acceptance of a legal duty is in some sense volitional lies at the heart of
 contractarian social theory: "There is but one law which, from its nature, requires unanimous
 consent; it is the social compact; for civil association is the most voluntary act in the world;
 every man being born free and master of himself, no one can, under any pretext whatever,
 enslave him without his consent." J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 164 (2d ed. R. Harring-
 ton trans. 1906).
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 B. Implementing Promise: Status and Contract
 Almost 120 years ago Sir Henry Maine found in history a steady
 progression from status to contract." Maine limited his definition
 of status to those standardized personal relationships derived from
 "the powers and privileges anciently residing in the Family."'2 Sta-
 tus, for instance, decreed that the first son would inherit the father's
 land. Scholars might argue as to the proper historical antecedents
 of status in Anglo-American jurisprudence, but the essence of the
 construct was that certain roles were imposed on a person by acci-
 dent of birth or by choice of vocation, the latter often being limited
 by the former. The division of labor was preordained and was based
 on some arbitrarily assigned characteristic.' The agricultural South
 prior to the Civil War, and to a lesser extent thereafter, was such a
 society in which status played a dominant part in social ordering.'4
 Professor Rehbinder, in an interesting and provocative article,'
 pointed out that Maine's definition of status was significantly dif-
 ferent from the meaning of the word in the civil-law tradition.' The
 Romans used status to denote full legal capacity (caput), which
 consisted of three elements: liberty (status libertatis), civil rights
 (status civitatis), and head of household (status [amiliae). 17 The loss
 of any one of these elements connoted a restricted legal capacity
 (capitis deminutio).18 The civil law derived two distinctly different
 concepts of status from Roman law. One, status civilis, developed
 from the Roman caput and related to an individual's position in
 the legal order. The other, status naturalis, referred to capacity
 based on physical and mental differences." An individual's status
 " See H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 168-70 (London 2d ed. 1864).
 2 Id. at 170. See Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 39 (1917).
 '3 Julius Stone has identified the Indian caste system as a classic example of a status-
 oriented society. There, as in many cultures, religion plays an extraordinarily important role
 in structuring the culture. The Hindu principle of Karma holds that each life is predeter-
 mined from birth into a particular caste and that this predestination is determined by the
 quality of the soul's prior life. To change castes would be to impose human choice on the will
 of the divine, which to a true believer would be heresy. Thus the system retains a great deal
 of strength despite secular laws that superimpose Western notions of democracy, individual
 free will, and social equality. See J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 139-41
 (1966).
 '4 See generally K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1967); C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
 CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974).
 Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REv. 941 (1971).
 6 See generally id. at 941-47.
 '' See id. at 943.
 ' See id.
 See id.
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 naturalis might also have an effect on his status civilis.20
 Rather than denoting the possession of full legal rights and capac-
 ities, the term "status" in common law more often has been used
 to identify the privileges and obligations of a given individual or
 class in the currently prevailing social order, with naturally occur-
 ring characteristics often serving as the means for identifying a cer-
 tain status. Women, lunatics, blacks, Indians, and others have been
 limited from time to time in their legal rights and capacities simply
 by reason of their sex, color, ethnic background, or mental abili-
 ties-characteristics over which the individual has little control.
 Freedom of choice and volitional promise usually have played a
 relatively small role in status-dominated societies. Once status pre-
 determines an individual's responsibilities, privileges, obligations,
 and duties, the inability to change that status ensures predictability
 and an arguably rational division of labor.2'
 These elements of status provide a good backdrop for a definition
 of contract. I shall not attempt to redefine "contract" because that
 has been done with varying degrees of success by scores of legal
 commentators.22 Certain useful identifying characteristics," how-
 29 See id. at 943-44. In a meritocracy, this still occurs if status naturalis applies to mental
 as well as physical capacity.
 21 Of course, the perceived rationality of the division of labor in any society depends to a
 considerable extent on the observer's status within that social order.
 22 See, e.g., notes 23, 36 infra.
 23 I particularly like Professor Leff's approach. Instead of trying to reach a precise defini-
 tion, he suggests that contract partakes of certain identifying criteria:
 First of all, contracts seem to be some species of interpersonal behavior (as opposed to
 person-thing interactions). Second, the interpersonal behavior demanded for a con-
 tract seems to be more or less communicative (rather than directly effective, like a
 punch in the mouth). Moreover, the communication, to look contracty, ought to have
 a lot of future tense in it, and bear somewhat on the speakers' expected role in that
 future. Next, bargain and trade seems to smell more of contract than beneficence;
 there is the continual pressure to separate deals frqm gifts. Next is the limitedness of
 contract. There seems to be something significant to contract in the bordered relation-
 ship, "the deal," as opposed to more long-term, non-limit-bound interpersonal rela-
 tionship like husband-wife and father-son. Last . . . closely allied to the trade-bargain
 idea, is the process aura of contract. Contract seems to presuppose not only a deal,
 but dealing. It is the product of a joint creative effort. At least classically, the idea
 seems to have been that the parties combine their impulses and desires into a resulting
 product which is a harmonization of their initial positions. What results is neither's
 will; it is somehow a combination of their desires, the product of an ad hoc vector
 diagram the resulting arrow of which is "the contract".
 Leff, supra note 8, at 137-38 (footnotes omitted). Leff's analysis is extraordinarily useful
 because it helps with the identification of "contract" in much the same way that identifying
 characteristics help in the classification of flora and fauna. If a creature has hair, bears live
 young, is warm-blooded, and the female produces milk, it must be a mammal. Unfortu-
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 ever, do contrast with the common-law meaning of status. The first,
 and most important, difference is the scope of choice. One may be
 free to choose a status, but one does not necessarily have the right
 or the power to affect the impact of that status on legal capacity.
 Moreover, in choosing a status one has control over fewer variables
 in the transaction. A young man may freely join the army, but as a
 soldier he does not have much say in the way the army orders his
 life. Contracting parties have the opportunity, on the other hand,
 to determine for themselves the parameters of their transaction.
 They create their own status; they do not simply choose it. As Reh-
 binder has said: "Contract law burdened man by forcing him to
 create for himself a legal position . "... 24
 Other distinctions are individually less compelling, but cumula-
 tively they define a process and a result that reasonably may be
 distinguished from the concept of status. Like the tango, contract
 takes two. A single young man may join the army and thereby
 choose the status of soldier by himself;25 that same young man needs
 an active colleague to create a contract. A contract also requires a
 promise; thus it has some element of futurity.26 Finally, a contract
 also has some element of "bargaining," although in many, if not
 most, consumer transactions that fall under the general rubric of
 "contract" very little actual negotiation occurs.27 A relationship that
 involves a plurality of actors, private volition, futurity, and some
 bargaining would, therefore, be more properly characterized as
 being governed by a contractual model than by a status model.
 These theoretical distinctions, however, fray at the edges. A
 "contract" may lead to the assumption of a socially imposed status
 rather than to one that is the creation of the contracting parties.
 John and Mary may freely agree to marry, and they may negotiate
 nately, there still is the platypus. For a somewhat more cynical view, see Snyder,
 Contract-Fact or Legal Hypothesis?, 21 Miss. L.J. 304, 306 (1950).
 24 Rehbinder, supra note 15, at 955.
 25 This assertion is not quite true. The army can accept or reject the application of the
 volunteer thus creating a certain duality, but if the individual meets the preordained require-
 ments no negotiation of the terms of the new status occurs, except to the extent that the
 volunteer may state a preference for a particular branch.
 26 When I ask a gasoline attendant to fill my car, implicit in my request is a promise to
 pay when he has completed filling the tank, even though the entire transaction may occur
 within a short span of time. Not more than five minutes might pass altogether, but I do not
 usually pay until after I get the gasoline, even though I promise to pay for it before the
 attendant removes the cap on the tank.
 27 See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
 Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Leff, supra note 8.
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 about matters such as time, place, and guests. That agreement has
 the earmarks of a contract, and indeed if it is broken, the courts will
 entertain an action for breach of contract.28 Nevertheless, marriage
 itself is governed by a status construct: the law imposes certain
 duties and responsibilities upon the partners wholly without regard
 to any expression of individual will.29
 C. Liberty Through Contract or Status: An Historical Perspective
 As noted previously,30 Maine saw a progression throughout history
 from status to contract. Implicit in Maine's statement about
 ''progress" was the notion that a linear legal development from the
 crudity of status to the refinement of liberty in and through contract
 had occurred. In terms of events up until Maine's day, such a thesis
 has some merits. Developments since he wrote, however, have cast
 doubt on contract as the sole means of achieving liberty.
 Feudalism, both in England and on the continent, rested largely
 on status.3' Lack of central government and an agricultural economy
 led to a hierarchical society where the serf received protection from
 his lord in return for labor.32 This form of social organization led to
 significant restrictions on freedoms, both for serfs and for those
 higher up in the system.33
 The Renaissance, the Reformation, the voyages of expedition, and
 the increase in commerce beginning in the fifteenth century her-
 alded the end of feudalism and presaged social change of an unprec-
 edented degree.34 One such change was an increase in social mobility
 evidenced by the growing opportunity to choose one's status and to
 change it from time to time. Indeed, Professor Rehbinder suggested
 that Maine's comment really described a movement from imposed
 or "ascriptive" status to assumed or achieved status.35 The oppor-
 29 See, e.g., 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS ? 134 (1962).
 29 See generally Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF.
 L. REV. 1169 (1974); Note, Marriage, Contracts and Public Policy, 54 HARv. L. REV. 473
 (1941); text accompanying notes 131-70 infra.
 "' See text accompanying note 11 supra.
 I' See, e.g., M. BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 255-74 (1961).
 '2 See id. at 273.
 " See generally id. at 270-74; A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 30-35 (1973);
 T. PLUCKNErT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 506-20 (5th ed. 1956).
 '4 See generally G. ELTON, REFORM AND REFORMATION (1977).
 35 Rehbinder noted:
 According to Linton, periods of social change-especially the period after the break-
 down of the European class society-were characterized by a profusion of achievable
 statuses. Julius Stone drew on Linton in reformulating Maine's thesis of progress. The
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 tunity to exercise individual free will in the choice of a status did
 provide a setting for the emergence (or revival) of volitional promise.
 For example, scholars traditionally have argued that choice of a
 status sparked the development of assumpsit,36 the basis for modern
 contract law. John Locke even moved beyond the narrow commer-
 cial meaning of "contract" to develop a political theory based on a
 voluntary social agreement that ultimately rested government on
 free will.37
 The individualism and free will inherent in the contract relation-
 ship and the negotiating process were particularly appealing to
 nineteenth century minds; in the course of the industrial revolution
 and its aftermath contract theory became dominant.38 Freedom of
 development from status to contract is more accurately "a movement from 'ascriptive'
 status, fixed by birth and family rights, to status acquired on the basis of individual
 achievement." The modern trend, resting in part upon the distinctions of Linton and
 Stone, is to refer to ascribed status as status and to describe status achieved through
 merit and effort as achieved position. Thus status has become merely a certain kind
 of position in a hierarchic system of order.
 Rehbinder, supra note 15, at 954 (footnotes omitted) (discussing R. LINTON, THE STUDY OF
 MAN 115, 129 (1936); S. NADEL, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 29 (1957); J. STONE, supra
 note 13, at 639).
 36 See generally Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53 (1888);
 Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931). One of
 the more interesting characteristics of the Anglo-American jurisprudence of promissory trans-
 actions has been the difficulty for the state in enforcing promise as envisaged by the eccle-
 siastical and equity courts on the one hand and by the secular law courts on the other. In
 England, the Church and the Chancellor proceeded from the premises that promises were
 made to be kept and that the state should enforce them except in unusual circumstances.
 The law judges proceeded from the opposite premise: the state should not interfere with
 matters of private agreement except in rare cases. See generally Farnsworth, The Past of
 Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576, 591-96 (1969). The
 differing treatment of damages in contract and tort cases and the rare decree of specific
 performance are constant reminders that the law judges prevailed.
 37 See Laslett, Introduction to J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 112 (P. Laslett ed.
 1960) ("the transmutation [of contract] into the social and political condition must not be
 looked on in a legal way; it is a variable thing and a pretty loose one too"). The eighteenth
 century built on Locke's and similar theories in an effort to free humanity from all forms of
 bondage, whether social, political, or intellectual. See generally 2 P. GAY, THE ENLIGHTEN-
 MENT: AN INTERPRETATION (1969). Professor Gay has termed the approach of the philosopher
 "the science of freedom." See id. at ix-xi.
 38 Professor Lawrence Friedman has noted:
 In the 19th century, contract law, both in England and America, made up for lost time.
 This was a natural development. The law of contract was a body of law well suited to
 a market economy. It was the general branch of law that made and applied rules for
 arm's-length bargains, in a free, impersonal market. The decay of feudalism and the
 rise of capitalist economy made the law of contract possible; and the age of Adam
 Smith made it indispensable.
 L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 244 (1973). See generally L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT
 LAW IN AMERICA 15-27 (1965).
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 23 May 2017 02:33:38 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1978] Contract and Status 1047
 contract became almost synonymous with liberty. One English
 court in 1875 stated: "[I]f there is one thing which more than
 another public policy requires it is that men of full age and compe-
 tent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting,
 and that their contracts . . . shall be enforced by the Courts of
 justice."39 On this side of the Atlantic, the Supreme Court went so
 far as to hold that legislation limiting the working hours of bakers
 was an unconstitutional limitation on the freedom of bakers to con-
 tract to work longer hours.40
 In theory, this notion was all well and good. But, like laws that
 prohibit both rich and poor from sleeping under bridges,4' the obei-
 sance of the Supreme Court to the god of contract caused the Jus-
 tices to lose sight of some important facts. A system allowing free
 will to negotiate and bargain works fairly only if the parties are in
 reasonably equivalent positions of power. If a baker has the freedom
 to choose to work eighty hours a week or not to work at all, it
 stretches the truth to suggest that he is a free man, at least insofar
 as his economic livelihood is concerned. The classic theory of con-
 tract so hallowed by laissez-faire economists came to be criticized
 as a tool of the wealthy and not an instrument of liberty.42 The
 status construct had not really died but was being imposed in the
 name of contract by private aggregations of capital. This phenome-
 non amounted to a private rather than a public predetermination
 and ordering of societal roles. Although this might not have been
 "status" in the sense of a public imposition of duties and responsi-
 bilities, the origin of imposed obligations in private law rather than
 31 Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
 4" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The different treatment accorded women at
 this stage of American history is clearly illustrated by a comparison of Lochner with Muller
 v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In Muller, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a
 statutory limitation on the right of women to contract for their labor as a reasonable exercise
 of the police power. Liberty of contract thus was not so important as to interfere with the
 status of femininity protected by the state.
 ' See A. FRANCE, THE RED LILY 91 (1924 ed.).
 42 See, e.g., Isaacs, supra note 12; Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909). At
 least one commentator still adheres to the view that contract law as taught continues to favor
 the wealthy:
 [Contract law] serves massively and systematically as an intensifier of economic
 advantage and disadvantage. It does this because people and businesses who are in
 strong bargaining positions, or who can afford expensive legal advice, can and epidem-
 ically do exact of necessitous and ignorant people contractual engagements which the
 general law never would impose.
 Black, Some Notes on Law Schools in the Present Day, 79 YALE L.J. 505, 508 (1970) (emphasis
 in original).
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 in public law probably made little difference to those subject to the
 obligations.
 These criticisms fueled attacks by academic circles on the dogged
 adherence of courts to the enforcement of private bargains that met
 the formal requisites of classical contractual theory. In 1917 Nathan
 Isaacs even suggested that status constructs might be more condu-
 cive to liberty than freedom of contract.43 This theory was heresy in
 terms of Maine's dictum, but Isaacs's point was quite simple: state
 interference could help equalize the bargaining power of the baker
 and his employer. This approach would necessarily reduce the
 power of the employer, but the net result would be more in keeping
 with the basic utilitarian principle of maximizing benefit." Isaacs's
 view came to be predominant, and today the state plays a signifi-
 cant role in ordering promissory transactions. Debate may continue
 about whether classical contractual theory is dead,45 but the impact
 13 Isaacs proposed a greater standardization of contractual relationships as a means for
 the development of a "status law" that would be conducive to liberty:
 The movement toward status law clashes, of course, with the ideal of individual
 freedom in the negative sense of "absence of restraint" or laissez faire. Yet, freedom
 in the positive sense of presence of opportunity is being served by social interference
 with contract. There is still much to be gained by the further standardizing of the
 relations in which society has an interest, in order to remove them from the control
 of the accident of power in individual bargaining.
 Isaacs, supra note 12, at 47. Many of our normal, everyday transactions have become highly
 standardized. Thus a more recent essay has suggested the use of standards based on the
 public interest as opposed to traditional contractual principles for determining the enforce-
 ability of consumer transactions:
 If contract law is to provide the basis for a democratic system of private law and for
 a competitive economy which works in the interests of consumers-indeed, if it is
 to meet the minimal requirements of rationality-it must take into account the two
 pervasive conditions under which modern contracting takes place. Most contracts
 today are made quickly, often without thought as to any but their major terms, and
 many contracts are made without one party having any real alternative but to accept
 the terms which the other party sets.
 Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv.
 L. REV. 529, 565-66 (1971).
 See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
 5 Grant Gilmore, for one, has proclaimed that contract is dead. See G. GILMORE, THE
 DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). Although he later said that he had meant the phrase more as a
 rhetorical flourish than as a definitive statement, see G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
 107 (1977), he did manage to provoke a lively controversy. See Milhollin, More on the Death
 of Contract, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 29 (1974); Gordley, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REv. 452 (1975);
 Gordon, Book Review, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1216; Mooney, Book Review, 55 ORE. L. REV. 155
 (1976); Reitz, Book Review, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 697 (1975); Speidel, Book Review, 27 STAN.
 L. REV. 1161 (1975). Reflecting on Gilmore's comment about the demise of contract, Professor
 Speidel stated:
 In retrospect, it would seem that Professor Gilmore's heady glass of tort wine is half
 full, his stale glass of contract beer is half empty, and his tolerance for static-model
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 of antitrust laws, securities laws, labor laws, consumer protection
 laws, and the myriad of regulations issued daily by administrative
 agencies have made fundamental changes in the contracting pro-
 cess. If we accept Wolfgang Friedmann's definition of "status" as
 "a useful collective description of legal conditions imposed upon the
 individual by public law,"46 then little doubt remains that a signifi-
 cant increase in the importance of status constructs as a means of
 societal ordering has occurred. If contract was the central legal sym-
 bol of the ideal laissez-faire state, status is the legal banner of the
 ideal welfare state.47
 D. Three Modern Approaches to Contract and Status
 The Maine-Isaacs debate has continued for the last half century.
 The controversy has tended to center on whether we are moving to
 a status-dominated social order, to a revival of contract, or to some
 other means of dealing with the problem of promise. Professors Reh-
 binder, MacNeil, and Friedmann, among others, have considered
 these questions and have come to somewhat different but not incon-
 sistent conclusions.
 Rehbinder rejected the suggestion that modern law tends to re-
 turn to status. His rejection was premised upon a definition of status
 that is limited to the hierarchical ordering of feudal society.48 He
 went on, however, to describe modern Western societies as ones in
 which an individual is free to choose among a wide variety of roles
 for various ends. These "roles" are created, defined, and protected
 by the state:
 As social life constantly increases in complexity, there is a growing
 need for more preformed and safeguarded roles. This leads to a
 growth in the size and scope of the legal system. Freedom of the
 individual today consists less in a freedom of role creation than in a
 freedom of role choice. This combination in our social system of
 ''personal mobility with relational stability" is also a characteristic
 economists and empiricists who just count has expired. This impatience is understand-
 able, for both the beer and some social scientists have frequently resisted the perceived
 requirements of justice.
 Speidel, supra at 1182 (footnotes omitted).
 lo Friedmann, Some Reflections on Status and Freedom, in EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN
 HONOR OF ROsCOE POUND 222, 226 (R. Newman ed. 1962) (emphasis in original).
 l' See id. at 229. See generally Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from
 Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286 (1962).
 "I See Rehbinder, supra note 15, at 947-48.
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 of modern law: It is a law of roles preformed and safeguarded by the
 state, yet open and subject to constant change.49
 Rehbinder may prefer the use of the term "role," but the "roles"
 he described certainly bear a striking resemblance to assumed sta-
 tuses. His roles are not the creatures of private bargaining; they are
 created and imposed by the state. The roles may be constantly
 undergoing changes, but these changes are the result of state, not
 private, action. Individual volition plays a part only in the assump-
 tion of a role or a set of roles. The understanding of status may not
 be the same as that of Maine,50 in that Rehbinder's "roles" are not
 creatures of the family tradition nor derivatives of feudalism. None-
 theless, they do reflect the imposition of public obligations and
 restrictions.
 MacNeil distinguished between "contract transactions" and
 "contractual relations."5' The former are more closely akin to what
 we tend to think of as contracts and the latter are closer to status.
 MacNeil was aware of the impossibility of isolating these concepts
 and recognized that they are simply part of a continuum. No
 "transaction" is wholly without "relation" and no "relationship" is
 wholly without transactional discreteness.52 He concluded:
 Contract has thus always meant-even if this has not always been
 admitted-far more than promise-in-transaction-measured-
 exchange-truly-specified-and-truly-communicated. And the bur-
 dens of the other aspects constantly increase as we in modern
 societies find ourselves increasingly engaged in exchange relations
 involving complex mixtures of internalization, command, relational
 expectations, specific promise and other even more vague psycho-
 logical and cultural motivators.53
 MacNeil's analysis is especially useful because he accepted what
 common sense and common experience teach us-that most rela-
 tionships involving exchange are a reflection of mutual expectation
 and reliance rather than of a carefully negotiated bargain. To im-
 prove the reliability of such transactions and to foster economic
 stability and predictability, a natural tendency exists toward the
 growth of "relations" that take the place of discrete transactions.
 "I Id. at 955 (citations omitted).
 i See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
 1' See MacNeil, supra note 6, at 723.
 52 See id. at 725.
 51 Id. at 733 (footnote omitted).
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 The widget manufacturer wants his market to expand profitably,
 but he also wants his market to be as predictable as possible so that
 he may plan for a rational allocation of his resources.54 MacNeil's
 thesis was that the complexities of technological society demand
 increased use of relational constructs as opposed to transactional
 ones.55 One reason is that people simply do not have the time to
 negotiate all the separate transactions necessary to be a functioning
 member of society. MacNeil's relations, like Rehbinder's roles,5"
 usually can be chosen. Unlike Rehbinder, MacNeil believed that
 private individuals may create and define their relations instead of
 having them all preformed by the state.
 The late Professor Wolfgang Friedmann was most straightforward
 in his analysis of the role of status as an organizational construct in
 modern society. Friedmann's definition of "status" included all
 publicly imposed legal conditions on individual activity.57 This no-
 tion was much broader than either Maine's use of the word in the
 context of family relationships or the limitation of "status" to the
 antithesis of "contract." Friedmann's definition can provide a
 means for testing cyclical changes in the balance between individu-
 alism and collective, communal needs: "In short, 'status' thus be-
 comes a convenient shorthand description of the shifting balance
 between freedom of will and freedom of movement-which is essen-
 tially the province of private law-and the public policies of the
 modern welfare state expressed in terms of public law."58 Fried-
 mann's definition of status did not, however, include privately or-
 4 The widespread use of requirements or output contracts is reflective of this general desire
 for stability and predictability. See generally 1A A. CORBIN, supra note 28, ?? 158, 168. Of
 course, a good thing may be taken too far. The cooperation necessary to create a stable and
 predictable market may become anticompetitive and cause antitrust problems. For instance,
 the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, promoted the use of trade
 associations to encourage cooperative efforts aimed at stabilizing various sectors of the econ-
 omy. After the Act was declared unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
 States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), many of these trade associations continued to flourish. Their
 activities led the Justice Department to launch 72 criminal and 58 civil antitrust actions
 between 1939 and 1943. In all but three of these cases, the defendants agreed to a consent
 order or lost the trial. Sadd, Huth, Cortesio, & Hunter, Report on Antitrust Implications of
 Joint Industry Activities Under Price Controls, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 426 (1975). See also
 MacCauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV.
 55 (1963); MacCauley, The Use and Nonuse of Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry,
 PRAC. LAW., Nov. 1963, at 13; MacNeil, supra note 6, at 729-30.
 55 See MacNeil, supra note 6, at 720-21.
 56 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
 5 See Friedmann, supra note 46, at 225-26.
 Id. at 228.
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 dained and created statuses. MacNeil's privately created "relation"
 would not, therefore, be characterized by Friedmann as a "status."59
 The distinction lies in the role of the state: as a practical matter, a
 New York baker at the turn of the century was locked into a re-
 stricted economic situation by certain aggregations of private capi-
 tal and wealth, but this situation was not publicly imposed or cre-
 ated although it continued to exist partly as a result of the refusal
 of the state to become involved. Insofar as the individual baker was
 concerned, it probably made little difference to him that his status
 was privately imposed under the rubric of freedom of contract and
 was not the result of public action.A0 Friedmann's definition, broad
 as it may be, does not include all the "roles" that might be practi-
 cally classified under the heading of "status," but it is an easier
 definition to use for legal analysis than MacNeil's broader use of
 relational constructs. Friedmann's definition can more readily serve
 as a barometer for changing governmental attitudes toward the per-
 missible limits of state interference in commercial and personal
 relationships between individuals because it is concerned with ac-
 tive, direct state intrusions rather than with passive acquiescence
 by the state in privately created relationships.
 Having formulated his definition, Friedmann turned to the prob-
 lem of whether status or contract is more conducive to personal
 liberty. Like Maine,"' Friedmann perceived a decline in the impor-
 tance of status in the regulation of family relationships and a con-
 comitant increase in the use of contract in such situations." More-
 over, Friedmann saw this trend as conducive to personal liberty:
 "It is, of course, not an accident or caprice that in the field of family
 law the movement should still be from status to contract. It is in
 this field that freedom of contract on the whole genuinely expresses
 social and economic liberation from traditional inequality and im-
 mobility."fi3 Although the trend in domestic relations vindicated
 Maine's thesis that contract leads to liberty, "an examination of
 status in the wider sense might lead us to a rather different conclu-
 sion."" More particularly, Frieimann concluded that status had
 59 Conversely, Rehbinder's roles correspond to Friedmann's statuses in this respect. See
 text accompanying note 49 supra.
 6" See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
 "' See notes 11-12, 35 supra and accompanying text.
 11 See Friedmann, supra note 46, at 235-36.
 "' Id. at 236.
 "' Id. at 226.
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 come to play an increasingly important role in the ordering of com-
 mercial activities."5 Much of our commerce now represents a min-
 gling of publicly imposed regulations, conditions, and limitations on
 private volitional bargaining. Friedmann perceived this interference
 by the state as generally conducive to individual liberty,66 echoing
 Isaacs's view of a half century before."7 Thus a seemingly contradic-
 tory trend can be found in modern law: contract leads to freedom
 in domestic relations, while status produces liberty in other areas.
 Of course, not everyone has accepted Friedmann's theory."8 What
 the remainder of this article does is test Friedmann's thesis against
 a series of recent cases in two areas traditionally characterized by
 extensive use of status constructs. One is race and the other is
 marriage, or, more expansively, long term intimate relationships
 between men and women."9 Such an analysis reveals that neither
 status nor contract alone leads to freedom in either of the two areas.
 Rather, the complexity of the social, political, and moral issues
 involved requires a more delicate and careful mixing of contract and
 status.
 See id. at 229-33.
 6 See id. at 237.
 7 See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
 Among the most notable of those who have not fully accepted Friedmann's thesis is
 Professor Harry Jones, who stated in a lecture given in honor of the memory of his late
 colleague:
 What has happened . . . is that areas of decision formerly subject to the rule of
 superior economic power have been brought within the reach of law. The incidence of
 genuine contractual bargaining has not been reduced necessarily; indeed, government
 interventions designed to establish equality of bargaining power may conceivably
 make contract a more vigorous institution in our day than in Sir Henry Maine's.
 . . .The employment relation may have become a relationship of status for the
 typical industrial worker, but practically every other relationship of his life is arrived
 at and regulated by the contracts he enters into with landlords, grocers, physicians,
 car dealers, banks and others. Even his church contribution is not a prescribed tithe,
 as when church membership was an imposed status, but a contractual pledge. So I
 suspect that old Sir Henry Maine is nearer to the truth, even in contemporary condi-
 tions, than most of his critics. From status to contract is a long historical movement,
 and we have not really reversed the trend, however much we may have compromised
 it or set new ground rules for negotiation.
 Jones, The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 43, 50 (1975) (footnote omitted).
 See also Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143 (1958).
 11 The validity of Friedmann's thesis in the area of commerce is beyond the intended scope
 of this particular article, but the impact of commercial regulation can be felt in some of the
 cases that are considered.
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 II. THE REMOVAL OF RACE AS A VALID BASIS FOR
 DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAKING OF PRIVATE CONTRACTS
 An element of free agreement between the contracting parties has
 been essential to all classical theories of contract.70 One of the most
 significant aspects of "liberty" in contracting traditionally has been
 the freedom to choose the identity of the other party to the agree-
 ment.71 A status construct can remove free choice from the selection
 of a contracting party by imposing on one or the other a duty to
 contract regardless of personal desires. A crucial development in the
 movement from feudal concepts of status to contract in the nine-
 teenth century sense was the recognition of a right to refuse to
 contract for reasons safe unto oneself.72 The corollary was the right
 to pick a contracting party for reasons other than rational econom-
 iCs.
 Recently, courts have limited the privilege to discriminate ra-
 cially in the selection of a contracting partner. In 1968 in Jones v.
 Alfred H. Mayer Co.," the Supreme Court breathed new life into
 a section of one of the nineteenth century Civil Rights Acts74 by
 construing it as based upon the thirteenth amendment, thereby
 removing the necessity of showing state action.75 The Court held
 that section 1982 76 prohibits racial discrimination in the private sale
 or rental of housing because such discrimination is one of the
 "badges of slavery" that the thirteenth amendment and its enabling
 legislation were intended to eradicate.77
 70 See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
 7 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS ? 19(b) (1936).
 72 A comparison of the famous Horse Doctor's Case, Y.B. Hil. 19 Henry 6, f.5, pl. 49 (1441),
 with the celebrated case of Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901), illus-
 trates this change. In the Horse Doctor's Case, the court held that the injured party assumed
 the risk unless the other expressly assumed it. Thus a mere promise to give medicine to a
 horse did not mean the promisor promised to cure the animal properly. Had the defendant
 in the Horse Doctor's Case been a "common horse doctor," there might have been no need
 to consider whether there had been an individual "undertaking" or "promise" to cure because
 the court could have implied such a promise from his status, and the development of the
 assumpsit action might have been delayed even further. In Hurley there was no question that
 the defendant was a licensed physician, but the court refused to place upon him any legal
 duty to attend the sick. He was free to contract to treat a patient or not according to his own
 whim.
 71 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
 7 Civil Rights Act of 1866 ? 1, 42 U.S.C. ? 1982 (1976).
 75 See 392 U.S. at 422-26.
 '6 Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
 every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
 sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. ? 1982 (1976).
 7 See 392 U.S. at 439-40. Several cases followed Jones and used ? 1982 as the basis for an
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 Since Jones, section 1982 has been broadly interpreted. In
 Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association,78 a residential
 community maintained a neighborhood swimming pool. Families
 who lived within a three-quarter mile radius of the pool could belong
 to the swimming pool association. When a black family moved into
 the neighborhood, the association passed resolutions that barred
 blacks from membership and limited guests to relatives of members.
 The Supreme Court ruled that the association was not a private
 club within the meaning of an earlier decision;79 therefore the refusal
 of membership was an effective denial of a property right. The his-
 tory of eligibility for membership that went with ownership in the
 area helped the Court in finding this property right.80 In any event,
 although section 1982 is directed toward rights in property, its pro-
 hibition on discrimination in the sale or rental of housing directly
 affects the bargaining function by limiting the offeror's freedom to
 restrict his offer to persons of a certain race.
 The companion provision to section 1982, section 1981,81 has been
 construed in pari materia with it.82 Section 1981 provides: "All per-
 attack on housing discrimination. E.g., Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1974).
 In 1968, Congress passed the Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-
 284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. ?? 3601-3631 (1976)). Congress specifically intended
 to lessen housing discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. ? 3601 (1976), but Jones exceeded the scope
 of that Act. Section 3603(b)(1) exempts from the coverage of the Act single family homes
 offered for sale or rent by the owner. Section 3603(b)(2) contains what is popularly known
 as the exemption for "Mrs. Murphy's boarding house"-one in which four or fewer families,
 including the owner, reside. Arguably, ? 1982, as construed in Jones, would reach discrimina-
 tory acts facially exempted from the impact of the Fair Housing Act by ?? 3603(b)(1) and
 3603(b)(2). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 478 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
 Section 3607 allows religious organizations and private clubs to limit sales or rentals to
 members of that club or religion. The first amendment may immunize legitimate religious
 groups from the coverage of ? 1982. Thus the constitutional status of religious groups may
 increase their freedom to contract concerning housing. See generally notes 102-06 infra and
 accompanying text.
 78 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
 71 Id. at 438-39 (distinguishing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (discrimi-
 nation by a private club does not violate the fourteenth amendment)). Accord, Sullivan v.
 Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
 "I See 410 U.S. at 438-40. Thus if the swimming pool association had been formed after
 the neighborhood was desegregated, the case might have been more difficult for the Court.
 "' 42 U.S.C. ? 1981 (1976). Like ? 1982, ? 1981 dates from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch.
 31, ? 1, 14 Stat. 27. Significant debates, however, preceded its reenactment in the Civil Rights
 Act of 1870, ch. 114, ? 16, 16 Stat. 140. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168
 n.8 (1976). The 1866 and 1870 debates have been thoroughly discussed by the litigants and
 the judges who have been involved in the recent series of ? 1981 and ? 1982 cases. The debates,
 like most congressional debates, contained support for almost any position. Compare id. with
 id. at 195-205 (White, J., dissenting).
 82 The Court stated in Tillman: "In light of the historical interrelationship between ? 1981
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 sons . . . shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
 make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens
 . "83 The private-school desegregation case, Runyon v. Mc-
 Crary,84 is the most important recent decision involving section
 1981. The Supreme Court held that the statute prohibited private,
 commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admis-
 sion to prospective students because they were black.' Black
 parents had sought to have their children admitted to each of two
 private schools located in the Virginia suburbs of Washington,
 D.C. Some factual dispute took place in the lower courts about the
 reasons for denial of admittance, but in the Supreme Court the
 case proceeded on the assumption that the schools practiced racial
 selectivity.87 The schools contended that such discrimination was
 permissible because they were private and could contract or refrain
 from contracting with parents of applicants on whatever grounds
 they saw fit, subject only to reasonable state regulations to ensure
 compliance with mandatory school attendance laws and to estab-
 lish minimum standards for accreditation. The Supreme Court did
 not disagree with the basic argument in favor of the freedom to
 choose one's contracting partner and terms, but the Court did elim-
 inate one element of choice: no longer could the decision to agree
 or not to agree be based solely upon a racial preference. Justice
 Stewart stated for the majority: "It is now well established that
 ? 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 . . . prohibits racial discrimina-
 tion in the making and enforcement of private contracts."88
 What is remarkable about the preceding quotation is that no
 Court ever had construed section 1981 so broadly, nor did the facts
 of Runyon compel such a sweeping prohibition of racial discrimina-
 tion in private promissory transactions." Indeed, Justice Stewart
 made some attempts to soften the impact of his statement. For
 instance, the majority left undisturbed the Court's previous holding
 that a private social organization could limit its membership on
 and ? 1982, we see no reason to construe these sections differently when applied ...." 410
 U.S. at 440.
 83 42 U.S.C. ? 1981 (1976).
 84 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
 85 See id. at 167-75.
 86 For the lower court proceedings, see Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F.
 Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), and McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d
 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
 87 See 427 U.S. at 168.
 88 Id. (footnotes omitted).
 89 See notes 102-07 infra and accompanying text.
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 racial grounds90 and specifically left open the question whether sec-
 tion 1981 might apply to private sectarian schools that practice
 racial discrimination on religious grounds.9'
 Most of the cases under section 1981 prior to Runyon had dealt
 with employment discrimination,92 although they had handled a
 smattering of other issues.93 In fact, section 1981 had become an
 alternative to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 in much the
 same way that section 1982 had become an alternative to the 1968
 Fair Housing Act.95 For example, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
 Transportation Co.,9" the companion case to Runyon, was yet an-
 other employment discrimination case, but the plaintiffs were
 white. The Court decided that, under the appropriate circumstan-
 ces, both title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and section 1981
 protect white as well as nonwhite persons from racial discrimination
 in private employment.97
 Runyon and McDonald set the stage for a more expansive reading
 of section 1981 and present some interesting dilemmas. The major-
 ity in Runyon made the following statement: "[A] Negro's ? 1 right
 to 'make and enforce contracts' is violated if a private offeror refuses
 to extend to a Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the same oppor-
 tunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees."98 If
 McDonald means what it says, then the preceding sentence could
 be rewritten to insert "Caucasian" in place of "Negro" and "black"
 in place of "white." Does that mean, then, that a private Negro
 college,99 founded for the express purpose of providing higher educa-
 See 427 U.S. at 167 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)).
 s, See id.
 S See generally Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimi-
 nation in Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 56 (1972).
 S3 See generally Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrimi-
 nation and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HARV. L. REV. 412, 412 n.6 (1976).
 S 42 U.S.C. ?? 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1976).
 S See note 77 supra.
 6 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
 s See id. at 280.
 S 427 U.S. at 170-71 (citations omitted).
 S 5ome time will elapse before the Court reaches a firm rule on preferential treatment of
 blacks by publicly supported universities. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct.
 2733 (1978), the Court ruled narrowly that a federally funded medical school's special pro-
 gram that kept open a specified number of positions for minority applicants was invalid under
 title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. ? 2000d (1976). See id. at 2744-47, 2761-64;
 id. at 2811-15 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). The Court also held, however, that
 race may be taken into account in making admissions decisions. See id. at 2760-63; id. at
 2789-91 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). The disparate rationales of the various
 Justices preclude any confident prediction of how willing they might be to bar the exclusion
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 tion for Negroes, endowed for that purpose and supported by alumni
 and friends, must offer the "same opportunity to enter into con-
 tracts" (as students or as faculty or staff) to whites as to blacks?
 That is what the words quoted above seem to indicate.'00 Counter-
 vailing policy considerations may, of course, cause the Court to
 soften the apparent impact of Runyon and McDonald, and the
 Court only scratched the surface of the underlying issues in Regents
 of the University of California v. Bakke.'01
 Runyon, despite Justice Stewart's wholesale statements, was lim-
 ited to discrimination by private, nonsectarian, commercial
 schools."'2 Two factors seemed to be especially important in the
 Court's reasoning. First, the schools advertised in the yellow pages
 and made their existence and purposes known to the world at large.
 Nothing in their commercial solicitations indicated that their edu-
 cational services were not generally available to the public.'03 Sec-
 ond, the schools were performing what was essentially a public func-
 tion-the education of children of a certain age. Justice Stewart
 noted: "The Court has repeatedly stressed that while parents have
 a constitutional right to send their children to private schools . . .
 that offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right
 to provide their children with private school education unfettered
 of a white from a private black college under ? 1981. See generally O'Neil, Preferential
 Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699
 (1971).
 I' In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), Justice Stevens, writing
 for four members of the Court, implied that title VII might preclude preferential hiring of
 minorities. Citing McDonald, he wrote: "Congress responded to the problem of employment
 discrimination by enacting a provision that protects all races ...." Id. at 2811 (Stevens,
 J., concurring and dissenting) (citing McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. at
 279).
 Justice Stevens, however, writing for the majority in McDonald, specifically excluded
 "affirmative action programs" from the scope of the decision. 427 U.S. at 280 n.8. Courts
 today are split on the issue of whether title VII prohibits preferential hiring or promotion of
 members of racial minorities by employers who have not previously discriminated by race in
 employment practices. Compare Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. AT&T, 556
 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3145 (1978) (upholding racial classifications
 in a promotion plan embodied in a consent decree), with Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
 Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977) (striking down racial quotas in a promotion plan adopted
 through collective bargaining where there had been no showing that employer had previously
 discriminated), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1978) (No. 78-435).
 "" 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). See notes 99-100 supra. For a discussion of some possible ap-
 proaches to the problem, see Note, supra note 93, at 440-52.
 112 See 427 U.S. at 168.
 '0 See id. at 172-73. Being involved in a commercial enterprise does not automatically
 mean that one can be compelled to contract with all comers. It may, however, mean that one
 cannot be racially exclusive in making offers to contract.
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 by reasonable government regulation."'94 Even though state action
 sufficient to invoke the protection of the fourteenth amendment was
 not found,'05 a private school still is engaged in the performance of
 an important function normally undertaken by the state, and that
 fact may serve to limit the impact of Runyon. A private black col-
 lege provides a service that is often, but not universally, provided
 by the state. It does not, however, perform a function the state
 would otherwise have to perform. A significant qualitative differ-
 ence therefore exists between the two educational institutions.'96
 In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell provided an alternative
 analysis for a limitation on Runyon's impact:
 '" Id. at 178.
 Id. Even if state action had been found, it is possible that no real question of state
 interference with private bargaining would have been present because one party (the school)
 would be acting as a quasi-public institution. One commentator has argued that by perform-
 ing the public function of teaching children, a private school acts as an extension of the state
 and thereby becomes subject to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. See Note, The
 Desegregation of Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the Answer?, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1147, 1151
 (1973). See also O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155 (1970).
 The state action argument generally has not been successful, even when the discriminating
 schools were receiving direct and indirect state and federal support. On what constitutes state
 action in education, see Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973);
 Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Coleman
 v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970); Brown v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.
 1969); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Rackin v.
 University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple
 Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal.
 1973); Powe v. Miles, 294 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd as modified, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
 1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See
 generally Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973).
 I'l Private universities and colleges are, nevertheless, subjected to a great deal of govern-
 mental interference. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. ? 2000d (1976), title IX
 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. ?? 1681-1682 (1976), and ? 504 of the
 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. ? 794 (1976), require private universities to refrain from
 acts of discrimination based on race, sex, or handicap on pain of being made ineligible for
 federal funds. For the regulations implementing these statutes, see 45 C.F.R. ?? 80-81, 84,
 86 (1977). The procedures that must be followed to terminate federal assistance to an institu-
 tion of higher learning are lengthy and provide the recipient school with a number of oppor-
 tunities to plead its case. See 20 U.S.C. ? 1682 (1976); 42 id. ? 2000d-1; 45 C.F.R. ? 80.8(c)
 (1977). A termination is certainly possible, however. Bob Jones University, a fundamentalist
 school in South Carolina, denies admission to unmarried black students. The federal govern-
 ment terminated veterans' benefits to students in attendance at Bob Jones, and the univer-
 sity challenged the government's action. The federal district court and the Court of Appeals
 for the Fourth Circuit upheld the cutoff of funds. Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp.
 597 (D.S.C. 1974), affd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the impact of
 such regulations on academic freedom in higher education, see Hunter, Federal Antibias
 Legislation and Academic Freedom: Some Problems with Enforcement Procedures, 27 EMORY
 L.J. __ (1978) (forthcoming).
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 In certain personal contractual relationships, however, such as those
 where the offeror selects those with whom he desires to bargain on
 an individualized basis, or where the contract is the foundation of a
 close association (such as, for example, that between an employer
 and a private tutor, babysitter, or housekeeper), there is reason to
 assume that, although the choice made by the offeror is selective, it
 reflects "a purpose of exclusiveness" other than the desire to bar
 members of the Negro race. Such a purpose, certainly in most cases,
 would invoke associational rights long respected.
 ? 1981, as interpreted by our prior decisions, does reach
 certain acts of racial discrimination that are "private" in the sense
 that they involve no state action. But choices, including those in-
 volved in entering into a contract, that are "private" in the sense
 that they are not part of a commercial relationship offered generally
 or widely, and that reflect the selectivity exercised by an individual
 entering into a personal relationship, certainly were never intended
 to be restricted by the 19th century Civil Rights Acts. The open offer
 to the public generally involved in the cases before us is simply not
 a "private" contract in this sense. 107
 Justice Powell thus tried to draw a distinction between agreements
 that involve particularly private matters or long term personal inti-
 macy on the one hand and those that are "commercial" in the sense
 that they are widely offered and widely available on a more or less
 standardized basis.
 This distinction is not wholly satisfactory. If a parent places an
 advertisement in the classified section of the newspaper for a house-
 keeper at $3.00 per hour, forty hours a week, is that an offer made
 ''generally or widely" for a commercial transaction that is subject
 to the provisions of section 1981, or is that an offer for a private
 agreement protected from statutory interference by generally recog-
 nized rights of association and privacy? Although Justice Powell
 may have wished to carve a broader exception to the majority's
 opinion, his rationale seems to be based on the notion that the state
 107 427 U.S. at 187-89 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Justice Powell's
 definition of a "private" contract free from the impact of ? 1981 is extremely narrow. It is
 doubtful that any member of the Court or any of the advocates in Runyon considered that
 the statute would intrude upon peculiarly domestic and individualized relationships such as
 those involving private tutors, babysitters, or housekeepers. Moreover, the application of
 ? 1981 to such arrangements might intrude upon the constitutionally protected zone of pri-
 vacy that surrounds an individual's home and domestic life, see generally T. EMERSON, THE
 SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 544-61 (1970); Note, supra note 93, at 436-37; Note, On
 Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 670 (1973).
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 cannot force persons to take someone into their home against their
 wishes however reprehensible their reasons for objecting to the indi-
 vidual may be. The focus on the agreement itself is misplaced in
 that some of the services that Justice Powell mentions certainly may
 be "commercial."
 Whatever the limitations on Runyon, it does impose a significant
 restriction on the choice of a contracting party, never so clearly
 articulated in any prior decision. Accepting that Runyon,
 McDonald, and similar cases seek to make certain private transac-
 tions color blind, what is the import of this rule from the perspective
 of the status and contract models?'08 Race, as noted above,'09 has
 often been a demarcator of status. Certainly that was true in the
 antebellum South."10 To the extent that the inability to make le-
 gally enforceable contracts was an aspect of the status of slavery,"'
 the thirteenth amendment can be regarded as removing that limita-
 tion. Former slaves were brought into the mainstream of citizenship
 in a number of ways-the capacity to contract being one of the
 attributes of full citizenship. Nevertheless, in the 1860's the status
 of "citizen" was not uniform. A "citizen" might not be able to vote
 if female, nor to hold office in certain areas if not a freeholder. White
 adult males who had never been convicted of a crime and who
 owned real property were, generally speaking, the only "citizens"
 possessed of what the Romans would have called caput."12
 A legal limitation on the exercise of some rights might not have
 been a "badge of slavery" in that other groups or classes, who were
 not slaves, also suffered similar limitations. At the time the thir-
 teenth amendment was passed, "freedom of contract" was not an
 automatic concomitant of emancipation. That aspect of freedom
 depended, to a large degree, upon other statuses, particularly age,
 sex, and mental competence. No one would seriously argue, for in-
 stance, that a slave who was a minor would have become able to
 make and enforce contracts the same as an adult upon release from
 his status as a slave. What emancipation did, in terms of contract
 law, was to subject former black slaves to the same set of privileges,
 rights, obligations, duties, and limitations as white citizens.
 I'l See generally notes 5-68 supra and accompanying text.
 '"I See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
 "' See generally J. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY (1972); E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JOR-
 DAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974); K. STAMPP, supra note 14. See also W.
 JORDAN, supra note 1.
 "I See W. JORDAN, supra note 1, at 134; K. STAMPP, supra note 14, at 341.
 112 See generally text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 23 May 2017 02:33:38 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1062 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 64:1039
 For the dissenters in Runyon, this goal was all Congress intended
 section 1981 to accomplish."13 Slaves, by their status, had been in-
 competent to make contracts in the same way that lunatics and
 infants were. Section 1981 made clear that sane blacks of the age of
 majority could enter into enforceable contracts to the same degree
 as sane, white adults."4 But the dissenters urged that section 1981
 did not grant to Negroes any greater freedom to contract than that
 enjoyed by whites, and they pointed out that a white person compe-
 tent to contract could not, as a general rule, force a contract upon
 an unwilling partner whether or not the unwillingness was moti-
 vated by personal dislike or racial bias:
 The right to make contracts, enjoyed by white citizens, was there-
 fore always a right to enter into binding agreements only with will-
 ing second parties. Since the statute only gives Negroes the "same
 rights" to contract as is enjoyed by whites, the language of the
 statute confers no right on Negroes to enter into a contract with an
 unwilling person no matter what that person's motivation for refus-
 ing to contract."'
 In short, the right to make a contract did not include the right to
 be free from the racial bias of prospective contractual partners.
 The majority's view, however, was that the thirteenth amend-
 ment and the Civil Rights Acts went further and removed individual
 racial bias as a permissible determining factor in the making of
 private contracts. In so doing, the Court in Runyon used liberating
 status constructs, continuing a trend that began with the criticism
 of the laissez-faire approach to contract."' As Isaacs suggested in
 1917, state interference to create certain relationships based on sta-
 tus may be more conducive to the development of liberty generally
 than adherence to the formalities of freedom of contract. "7
 In a pure contractual model, the individual must fend for himself.
 An offeror may pick and choose his offerees; the offerees may do the
 same. The resulting "bargain" is whatever the best negotiating
 techniques of the two parties produce. Under this model, if whites
 "' See 427 U.S. at 192-94 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice
 White's dissent. Id. at 192. The two also dissented in McDonald on the same grounds. See
 427 U.S. at 296 (White, J., dissenting).
 "I See 427 U.S. at 170-71.
 115 Id. at 194 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent did point out, however, that the com-
 bined effect of Runyon and McDonald was to preclude a black from refusing to contract with
 a white on the ground of race. See id. at 211.
 "^ See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
 "I See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
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 only deal with whites, then blacks must use their individual inven-
 tiveness to figure out some means of commercial and economic sur-
 vival. The state simply stays out of the picture and lets individual-
 ism have its free run of matters.
 Yet inequality of wealth and power may result over time in the
 creation of a social structure impervious to change, substituting a
 privately created static society for a state-imposed dynamic one.
 The modern state seeks to avoid this result through a variety of
 means related to contract. Legislatures and regulatory agencies
 often decree what may or may not be in an agreement, and they
 impose all manner of limitations on substantive terms, such as in-
 terest, time of payment, validity, and extent of warranties."8 More-
 over, courts no longer have as much difficulty in refusing to enforce
 bargains that are grossly one-sided and that represent what is per-
 ceived to be an unfair overreaching by the party with superior bar-
 gaining power."' Indeed, the Uniform Commercial Code specifically
 states that a court may refuse to enforce an "unconscionable" con-
 tract.'20 Of course, these limitations and constraints do not apply in
 all instances. Many situations still exist where parties of relatively
 equal bargaining power negotiate and create their own deals. No one
 seriously disputes, however, that we have substantially greater di-
 rect state interference with the bargaining function now than
 seventy-five years ago.'2' In effect, the state interferes with the
 See generally Woodard, supra note 47.
 9 For two of the classic cases in the area, see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
 120 U.C.C. ? 2-302. The literature on unconscionability is enormous. For some helpful
 articles, see Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Leff,
 Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967);
 Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931 (1969). The concept
 of unconscionability is not a modern phenomenon. It has its roots firmly set in Anglo-
 American jurisprudence. See Armstrong v. M'Ghee, Addison 261 (Pa. Westmoreland Cty.
 1795), reprinted in F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS 109 (2d ed. 1970). See also Scott v.
 United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870).
 121 For example, both the state and the federal governments regulate consumer credit. See
 H. KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDIT 1-5 (1970). The federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
 U.S.C. ? ? 1601-1692 (1976), contains extensive standards for disclosure. See generally Davis,
 Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the
 Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841 (1977). For a discussion of
 one state's disclosure standards, see American Home Improvement Co. v. MacIver, 105 N.H.
 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
 An interesting example of a regulatory agency's intrusion into the contracting process is
 the FTC's increasing criticism of the doctrine of holder in due course. Although the FTC has
 not directly tried to outlaw the doctrine, it has sought to require full disclosure of its effects
 and to prevent its enforcement in certain instances "where it is demonstrated that the doc-
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 "how" of contracting; the seller's methodology is what is primarily
 at stake. Once the state has intervened, however, the seller must use
 the same methodology with everyone, whether he is dealing with a
 wealthy lawyer or an illiterate indigent.
 Runyon goes a step further, but in a different direction, by dealing
 directly with the "who" of contracting as opposed to the "how."
 Courts and legislatures have been willing to say that allowing a
 sharp salesman to take advantage of a trusting, naive, or innocent
 consumer is unfair. Runyon says that it is unfair for an individual
 to be denied the opportunity to contract merely because of race, a
 factor over which the individual has absolutely no control. In a
 society founded on notions of free enterprise, saying that skin color
 is not a permissible basis for the exclusion of persons from participa-
 tion in private commercial transactions is perhaps less radical than
 saying that the naive, the stupid, and the innocent will be protected
 from the Darwinism of free enterprise capitalism.
 The dissenters in Runyon thus really beg the question. Histori-
 cally, whites simply have not been subjected to racial discrimina-
 tion in making contracts. To say that blacks can make enforceable
 contracts but no white person need contract with them would be
 insufficient. Blacks could contract among themselves, but whites
 historically have controlled the economy. Integration of blacks as
 citizens into the mainstream of American commerce necessitates
 interracial transactions.
 What Runyon does is substitute a public status construct for one
 developed from private ordering. Race is, in the civil-law sense, a
 status naturalis. Private, individual discrimination created a situa-
 tion in which this status naturalis came to determine part of an
 individual's status civilis.122 For blacks subjected to this form of
 exclusion from private bargaining, the result was not much different
 from that experienced by other groups, such as the bakers in
 Lochner v. New York. 123 The bakers were denied a freedom of eco-
 nomic choice because they lacked a counterbalancing economic
 power; blacks excluded from the opportunity to contract by reason
 of race similarly were denied a free choice in matters directly affect-
 ing their lives. Changes in the approach of courts and legislators to
 trine is unfair to consumers." In re Certified Building Prods., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1004, 1040
 (1975). See generally All-State Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
 U.S. 828 (1970).
 122 See generally notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
 123 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (discussed at notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text).
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 matters of contract, coupled with the growth of trade unions and a
 number of other social changes, put the bakers in a position of
 reasonable equivalence with their employers.'24 Runyon performs
 a similar function with respect to blacks by giving them the initial
 opportunity to engage in the bargaining process. This fact necessar-
 ily limits one aspect of freedom of choice: a racially prejudiced
 person cannot use racial bias as a factor in determining whether or
 not to contract. On the other hand, it opens an avenue of choice for
 a class of persons who have suffered from a certain absence of oppor-
 tunity by reason of a status naturalis. In the sense that the state
 limits the individual freedom of choice of some, it does impose a
 status construct.'25 Thus a paradox of American law continues-
 the state attempts to enhance and preserve the free market by
 limiting the discretion of participants in the market."2'
 The general goal of Runyon and similar cases is to promote free-
 dom in commercial intercourse by furthering the integration of ra-
 cial minorities into the mainstream of the American economy. This
 does not mean that Runyon, and particularly McDonald, might not
 operate contrary to other legislative, executive, and judicial policies
 also designed to promote social, political, and economic integration.
 As mentioned above,'27 Runyon and McDonald can be read to pro-
 hibit voluntary affirmative action programs in employment, al-
 though such programs have been accepted as one means for the
 equalization of the races in American society.'28 Similarly, social
 movements or attempts to promote ethnic or racial identity through
 separatist organizations could run afoul of these decisions.
 Thus the application of Friedmann's thesis129 to this area of the
 law means we must qualify his notion that status is conducive to
 24 See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
 125 Professor Cohen suggested some forty-odd years ago that the regulation of commercial
 transactions of this sort was a proper and reasonable exercise of sovereignty. He compared
 regulation of contract with regulation of traffic where limitations on vehicular traffic are
 necessary for the protection of the general freedom to travel on highways. Regulation of the
 "how" and "who" of contracting can, if properly designed, promote the general freedom of
 commercial intercourse. See Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 585-92
 (1933).
 "2 Runyon also evidences another recurring phenomenon of American decisional and statu-
 tory law: the manipulation of market mechanisms for social or political purposes.
 27 See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
 t28 For a discussion of the effect of ? 1981 on affirmative action programs, see Note, supra
 note 93, at 440-42. For an amusing discussion of the limitations of this approach, see D.
 BOORSTIN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ABSURD (1970).
 129 See notes 57-67 supra and accompanying text.
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 liberty in nonmarital matters. Runyon leads to the conclusion that
 the question is a relative one, depending on whose liberty is involved
 and on who is imposing the status. The cases reveal two trends that
 shed light on this idea. First, attempts to deal with the single prob-
 lem of racial discrimination have resulted in the development of
 contradictory status constructs. An "affirmative action" program
 requires that one be aware of racial, ethnic, and sexual distinctions.
 Status naturalis becomes an essential factor in the creation of a
 contractual relationship. Equality is unquestionably more laudable
 than the social inequality that has characterized much of American
 history, but the means are precisely the same as those of the "Jim
 Crow" statutes. On the other hand, Runyon and McDonald, by
 suggesting that private promissory transactions should be color
 blind, remove the element of prejudice from individual free choice.
 Affirmative action programs impose an element of prejudice on in-
 dividual free choice. In the first case, one loses the freedom to be
 racially prejudiced; in the second, one loses the freedom to be color
 blind.
 Second, the courts have moved from private to public imposition
 of status. Although one may doubt the efficacy of either Runyon or
 affirmative action programs in fostering social change, little doubt
 remains that both mark significant state interference with a funda-
 mental aspect of the bargaining process-the choice of a bargaining
 partner. This restriction means that the freedom to contract is
 broadened for a significant segment of society, but at the cost of a
 portion of the freedom in contracting.
 These two trends reveal the relative nature of Friedmann's thesis.
 He himself defined status as a publicly created relationship, which
 was consistent with Isaacs's belief that the state's status should
 replace that of employers.'30 The validity of a status thus depends
 on who imposes it. Moreover, the bigot's lost "freedom" to be preju-
 diced cannot be viewed as an isolated matter. It must be weighed
 against the total social benefit that accrues from according blacks
 greater freedom to contract. In a sense, the liberty portion of Fried-
 mann's formula relates to aggregate social freedom, just as the other
 half requires collective imposition of status.
 130 See notes 57, 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
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 III. THE COMPETING AND CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF CONTRACT
 AND STATUS IN LONG TERM INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS
 A. Marriage as Status
 Marriage usually has been regarded as a relationship governed by
 a status construct.'3' At common law, a woman's legal rights and
 capacities merged with those of her husband upon their marriage so
 that the two became a single legal entity with the husband as the
 controlling figure. Although the husband was in legal command of
 the relationship, he was obligated to provide his spouse and off-
 spring with the necessities of life.'32 Beginning in the nineteenth
 century, a number of states passed what were generally called
 "Married Women's Acts." These statutes together with some judi-
 cial decisions created a limited separate legal identity for married
 women.'33 This development followed Maine's thesis that legal prog-
 ress removes status generated by the family and replaces it with the
 capacity to contract.134
 For the most part, the recognition of a wife's separate legal iden-
 tity has been in the context of dealings with third parties or with
 respect to separate interests in property,135 but some specific classes
 131 See, e.g., MacNeil, supra note 6, at 725. For one of the most comprehensive discussions
 of the history and background of marriage, see H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS (1968).
 132 For a comprehensive discussion of traditional obligations of the marital relationship, see
 Weitzman, supra note 29. See generally Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETrE L.J. 441
 (1976).
 133 See generally Weitzman, supra note 29. A Georgia court in the midnineteenth century
 noted that the doctrines of the Bible and of the common law were being superseded by the
 introduction of a new principle from the civil law that husbands and wives were distinct
 persons and separate legal entities. See Wylly v. S.Z. Collins & Co., 9 Ga. 223 (1851). Judges
 often were reluctant to afford a liberal interpretation to attempts at emancipating females.
 Illustrative of this reluctance were cases involving the marriage of a woman to a man who
 was her debtor. The common-law rule was that marriage erased the antecedent debt. See
 Burleigh v. Coffin, 22 N.H. (2 Foster) 118, 127 (1850). Some courts construed the Married
 Women's Acts to abrogate this common-law rule, but others were unwilling to do so. For a
 collection of the cases, see Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 722 (1956).
 "I See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
 135 For instance, no one seriously disputes that a wife may take title to real property during
 coverture and hold the same as part of her separate estate in a common-law jurisdiction. (In
 a community property state, her spouse would have a 50% interest in property acquired
 during the marriage.) Husbands and wives may also become separately liable on contracts
 for services or products used in the marital relation, although sometimes the relationship
 itself may create a liability on the part of the husband (as the spouse charged with support)
 for something that the wife did in a situation where the husband would have no liability
 absent the marital relationship. See, e.g., Chas. S. Martin Distrib. Co. v. Foster, 140 Ga. App.
 12, 230 S.E.2d 77 (1976); Nabors v. Blanche Reeves Interiors, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 638, 229
 S.E.2d 117 (1976); Gibbs v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 50 Ga. App. 229, 177 S.E. 760
 (1934).
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 of contracts between husband and wife have been recognized as
 valid and enforceable. Antenuptial agreements with respect to prop-
 erty settlements usually have been enforced, unless they make a
 provision for property division upon divorce. In the latter instance,
 the contract usually has been treated as void because it may pro-
 mote a dissolution of the marriage.'36 Married couples may also
 enter into valid contracts about matters outside the context of the
 marital relationship itself, such as business agreements or property
 sales.'37 Nevertheless, enforcing such agreements may be difficult
 because of limitations imposed on litigation between spouses.'38
 Courts have refused to enforce agreements that seek to alter one
 or more aspects of the marital relationship itself as it is defined by
 law. 139 The reasons given for this refusal have been many and varied.
 One fear has been that the intimacy of marriage might make possi-
 ble an agreement fraudulent toward a third party.'40 Additionally,
 the state's continuing interest in the stability of the family as the
 basic organizational structure of society has been considered so
 great that the state has taken on the responsibility for defining the
 duties, obligations, and limitations of the relation.'4' Courts steeped
 in contractual theory also have repeated the formula that judges
 cannot enforce intramarital contracts because the parties do not
 intend that such agreements be attended by legal consequences,'
 136 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897
 (1973); Warren v. Warren, 235 Ga. 234, 219 S.E.2d 161 (1975); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 217 Ga.
 234, 123 S.E.2d 115 (1961). Cf. In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131
 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976) (adopting objective test as to whether agreement promotes dissolution).
 See generally 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 28, ? 1474; note 156 infra and accompanying text.
 13" See generally 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 65-71 (1935); McDowell, Contracts
 in the Family, 45 B.U.L. REV. 43, 46 (1965); Comment, Marital Contracts Which May Be Put
 Asunder, 13 J. FAM. L. 23, 24-28 (1973).
 138 For comprehensive discussions of the problems peculiar to litigation between spouses,
 see Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1650 (1966); Note, An
 Analysis of the Enforceability of Marital Contracts, 47 N.C.L. REV. 815 (1969).
 13" For a general discussion and collection of the leading cases, see Note, Marriage as
 Contract: Towards a Functional Redefinition of the Marital Status, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
 PROB. 607, 616-21 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Marriage as Contract]; Note, Marriage
 Contracts for Support and Services: Constitutionality Begins at Home, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1161
 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Marriage Contracts for Services].
 'IO See, e.g., Kennedy v. Lee, 72 Ga. 39 (1883).
 4' See, e.g., McDowell, supra note 137, at 48-49.
 142 One of the classic statements of this presumption was Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B.
 571. Lord Judge Atkin stated: "The common law does not regulate the form of agreements
 between spouses. Their promises are not sealed with seals and sealing wax. The consideration
 that really obtains for them is that natural love and affection which counts for so little in
 these cold Courts." Id. at 579. See also Havighurst, Services in the Home-A Study of
 Contract Concepts in Domestic Relations, 41 YALE L.J. 386, 390 (1932).
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 23 May 2017 02:33:38 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1978] Contract and Status 1069
 which is simply another way of saying that courts would have more
 difficulty in fashioning an appropriate remedy in a marital contrac-
 tual dispute than in a typical commercial bargain.'43 Judges also
 have shied away from intruding into what they perceive to be pri-
 vate matters that should be privately settled, even though the dis-
 agreement sometimes derives from a publicly imposed obligation.'44
 Finally, the short answer supplied by many courts has been that a
 postnuptial contract affecting intramarital duties may not be en-
 forced for either of two reasons: (1) it lacks consideration in that one
 party or the other simply agrees to do what the law already re-
 quires,'45 or (2) it seeks to amend statutorily imposed duties and
 therefore is contrary to public policy.'46 Regardless of which justifi-
 cation has been cited by a particular court, little doubt remains that
 marriage historically has been governed by status in Anglo-
 American jurisprudence.
 B. Marriage as Contract
 Recently, a number of commentators have suggested fundamen-
 tal changes in both the legislative and judicial approaches to mar-
 riage to allow the parties greater flexibility in structuring the form
 of their relationship.'47 Taken together, these proposals indicate the
 143 See, e.g., McDowell, supra note 137, at 48-50. See generally Fleischmann, Marriage by
 Contract: Defining the Terms of Relationship, 8 FAM. L.Q. 27 (1974); Havighurst, supra note
 142, at 397-98.
 '" As one court said not so long ago: "The law and equity not only allow but strongly
 encourage private settlements of family affairs." Trammell v. West, 224 Ga. 365, 366, 162
 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1968) (citing Folds v. Folds, 187 Ga. 463, 1 S.E.2d 4 (1939); GA. CODE ANN.
 ? 20-1205 (1977)). For a discussion of the distaste some courts have had for spousal con-
 tracts, see Cropsey v. Sweeney, 27 Barb. 310 (N.Y. App. 1858); notes 157-62 infra and accom-
 panying text.
 I For an interesting discussion of the question of preexisting duty in the context of the
 famous New York case of DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807, 163 N.Y.S. 823
 (1917), see 1A A. CORBIN, supra note 28, ? 177. See also Lloyd v. Fulton, 91 U.S. 479 (1875);
 Holsombeck v. Caldwell, 218 Ga. 393, 128 S.E.2d 47 (1962); Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246,
 34 A.2d 428 (1943).
 "I See, e.g., Towles v. Towles, 256 S.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 53 (1971); McDowell, supra note
 137, at 47-48; Weitzman, supra note 29, at 1259-63; Comment, supra note 137, at 34-35.
 "I See, e.g., B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 150-81, 233-57 (1963); R. LAING, THE
 POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 50-67 (1967); K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 66-73, 120-27 (1969);
 Davids, New Family Norms, TRIAL, Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 14; Edmiston, How to Write Your
 Own Marriage, Ms., Spring 1972, at 66; Fleischmann, supra note 143; Glendon, Power and
 Authority in the Family: New Legal Patterns as Reflections of Changing Ideologies, 23 AM.
 J. COMP. L. 1 (1975); McDowell, supra note 137; Rheinstein, The Transformation of Marriage
 and the Law, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 463 (1973); Note, Marriage as Contract, supra note 139; Note,
 Marriage Contracts for Services, supra note 139.
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 presence of basic inequalities in the status of marriage as currently
 defined. Unfairness may result from strict adherence to the rule that
 intramarital bargains ordinarily will not be enforced. The marriage
 "contract," the terms of which are imposed by the state, supersedes
 any private arrangement, no matter how clearly desired by both
 parties. In criticizing this approach, one commentator has said:
 The marriage contract is unlike most contracts: its provisions are
 unwritten, its penalties are unspecified, and the terms of the con-
 tract are typically unknown to the "contracting" parties. Prospec-
 tive spouses are neither informed of the terms of the contract nor
 are they allowed any options about these terms. In fact, one wonders
 how many men and women would agree to the marriage contract if
 they were given the opportunity to read it and to consider the rights
 and obligations to which they were committing themselves.'48
 Nevertheless, the courts on the whole have not reacted favorably
 to the call for greater freedom of contract as between married cou-
 ples.'49 An express contract about a subject outside the marital rela-
 tion may well be enforced, but agreements that seek to amend mari-
 tal obligations or that may appear to be in derogation of the mar-
 148 Weitzman, supra note 29, at 1170 (footnote omitted). Commentators have a strong
 feeling that women tend to get the worst part of the deal despite changes in marital laws to
 allow them to retain a separate legal identity. See, e.g., sources cited note 147 supra. For
 discussion of what effect the equal rights amendment might have on family law to redress
 inequalities, see Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
 Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 936-54 (1971); Freund,
 The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 234 (1971). In a
 very direct way, the traditional legal view of marriage has contributed to inequities in the
 taxing system that have affected both men and women. For a discussion of this general
 problem and suggestions for a new approach, see McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Family
 in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977).
 "I See generally notes 139-46 supra and accompanying text. The slightly ambivalent but
 generally negative reaction of courts to suggestions for fundamental changes in the marital
 relationship is probably a reflection of the general societal reaction. Professor Clark has
 stated:
 [A] majority of Americans still marry in the traditional way and continue to regard
 marriage as the most important relationship in their lives. It therefore seems that
 contemporary attitudes toward marriage differ fundamentally between a minority tak-
 ing an essentially hostile view of it and a majority upholding it with equal fervor. There
 is perhaps a third group of indeterminate size who see some merit in the arguments
 on both sides but who do not take a fixed position. If we could analyze the individuals
 in all three groups we might discover much greater ambivalence in their feelings about
 marriage than would be suspected from their public utterances. Ambivalence has
 always characterized people's reactions to this complex relationship, and there is no
 reason to suppose that our contemporaries are subject to any less conflicting emotions
 than were our ancestors.
 Clark, supra note 132, at 444 (footnotes omitted).
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 riage are not much more likely to be enforced now than they ever
 have been.'50 Some cases, however, show a tendency to give greater
 flexibility to bargaining between married partners. An agreement
 may be enforced with respect to the resumption of marital obliga-
 tions in certain circumstances if the purpose of the agreement is to
 stabilize a marriage.'5' Normally, an agreement to cohabit would be
 unenforceable as between spouses because the agreement would be
 to do only what the law already mandated.'52 This rule, however,
 may be relaxed in certain contexts. When the husband, for example,
 has acted in such a way as to forfeit his rights to cohabitation, the
 wife's agreement to live with him may be good consideration for his
 promise to transfer property.'53 This agreement supports a reconcili-
 ation and does not derogate the marital relationship. The couple
 have contracted in a manner consistent with and supportive of the
 status construct.'54
 More controversy has arisen with respect to antenuptial contracts
 that attempt to deal with property settlements and alimony in the
 event of dissolution of the marriage. Such agreements by their very
 nature contemplate the possibility of divorce. Even though a divorce
 may never occur or may be highly improbable, courts have been
 reluctant to enforce such agreements on the theory that they might
 provide a financial incentive to break up a marriage.'55 A few courts
 recently have modified this rule and have enforced such agree-
 ments.'5i6 The assumption that an antenuptial agreement for the
 1511 See generally notes 139-46 supra and accompanying text.
 See, e.g., Holsombeck v. Caldwell, 218 Ga. 393, 128 S.E.2d 47 (1962).
 15 In Holsombeck v. Caldwell, 218 Ga. 393, 128 S.E.2d 47 (1962), the court stated the
 general rule:
 "The mere promise of an undivorced wife to live with her husband and perform such
 duties as are ordinarily imposed upon her by the marriage contract is only a repetition
 of the promise made at the time the marriage contract was entered into. The law,
 seeking to regulate the marriage relation for the welfare of the State, will not allow
 married persons to discard this relation without justification and renew it for money."
 Id. at 395, 128 S.E.2d at 49 (quoting Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246, 252-53, 34 A.2d 428,
 432 (1943)).
 5'1 See id.
 "I See, e.g., McDowell, supra note 137, at 47, 51 n.35; Note, Marriage Contracts for
 Services, supra note 139, at 1166-67. For a discussion of the rationale, see Lacks v. Lacks, 12
 N.Y.2d 268, 273, 189 N.E.2d 487, 490, 238 N.Y.S.2d 949, 952 (1963) (Fuld, J., concurring).
 1S5 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897
 (1973); Warren v. Warren, 235 Ga. 234, 219 S.E.2d 161 (1975); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 217 Ga.
 234, 123 S.E.2d 115 (1961); Weitzman, supra note 29, at 1263-66.
 "I See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds on
 rehearing, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972);
 Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506
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 division of property in the event of divorce will encourage couples
 to dissolve their marriages is essentially an unprovable proposition.
 An equally valid argument is that an agreement entered into when
 the parties are friendly is likely to result in a reasonably fair divi-
 sion. At the very least, such agreements might be helpful in
 smoothing the separation process and thereby minimize the atten-
 dant emotional distress.
 Except in the relatively limited context of these cases, courts do
 not enforce interspousal contracts amending state-imposed marital
 responsibilities.157 Department of Human Resources v. Williams,158
 a 1973 decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals, came close to the
 enforcement of such a contract. Mr. Williams was permanently and
 totally disabled, and welfare was his sole means of support. A por-
 tion of his welfare payment (up to $100 per month) was earmarked
 for the employment of someone to perform personal and domestic
 services, and his wife agreed to do the necessary nursing work herself
 for the $100 allotment. When the state welfare agency found out
 about this arrangement, it cut off the extra payment, reasoning that
 Mrs. Williams merely was performing her spousal obligations as
 defined by law. Mr. Williams challenged the ruling and argued that
 his wife was acting beyond the requirements of duty.159 The court
 agreed and ordered the reinstatement of the extra allotment:
 As the husband's correlative legal duty of support does not legally
 bind him to support his wife in luxurious idleness, the wife's duty
 of performing ordinary household services can not legally bind her
 to render those extensive personal care services required by a hus-
 band who has suffered such brain damage that he must be tended
 as is a young child.
 P.2d 719 (1973). But cf. Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972) (upholding legitimacy of
 antenuptial agreements in general but invalidating antenuptial agreement for liquidated
 damages). See generally Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WILLAMETrE L.J. 413,
 435-38 (1976); Weitzman, supra note 29, at 1259-69.
 "' In some instances, courts have enforced an implied agreement of agency to protect the
 interests of a third party. Usually such an agency relationship has been implied from the
 husband's statutory duty of support. See, e.g., Oglesby v. Farmers Mut. Exchange, 128 Ga.
 App. 387, 196 S.E.2d 674 (1973). A wife may bind herself separately, however, and the
 husband may not be liable even with respect to necessaries in a proper case. See, e.g., Nabors
 v. Blanche Reeves Interiors, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 638, 639, 229 S.E.2d 117, 118 (1976) (dictum).
 Of course, many, perhaps most, couples vary the terms of the marriage contract in some
 particulars through informal agreements.
 "I 130 Ga. App. 149, 202 S.E.2d 504 (1973).
 59 See id. at 149-50, 202 S.E.2d at 505.
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 . . .It is law in Georgia that a husband is not entitled to the
 salary or wages of his wife, and shall not receive them without her
 consent. Code Ann. ? 53-512. In the shadow of this statute, if no-
 where else, stands the right of a married woman to the employment
 that will give her salary or wages. Her surrendering of this legal right
 to become a personal attendant to her husband is sufficient consid-
 eration for the express contract of employment, as she has suffered
 a legal detriment.'60
 Williams did not involve a dispute directly between the spouses,
 but if the court had applied its logic to a suit for wages by Mrs.
 Williams against her husband, she might have had a reasonably
 good chance of prevailing. The opportunities for fraud are obvious,
 particularly where public funds are used to pay the costs of the
 contract, but the presence or absence of fraud is a factual matter
 and not a legal impediment to recognizing the possibility of con-
 tracting. Williams explicitly recognizes the validity of an intramari-
 tal contract for personal services of a private nature, provided those
 services are beyond the scope of the duties normally imposed by
 law."1" The decision also recognizes that a spouse's surrender of the
 opportunity to work for a salary outside the home is a good and
 valuable consideration for a promise by the other spouse to make
 payments or to transfer property.'
 If courts do broaden the reasoning in Williams to cover inter-
 spousal disputes, they will have to confront the problem of what
 relief to accord a victorious plaintiff. Williams makes sense in the
 particular context of its facts, but even such a facially simple case
 illustrates the severe problem of remedies inherent in any attempt
 to validate intramarital contracts during the term of marriage itself.
 Specific performance does not lie if the contract is one for personal
 services,'63 so the remedy must be limited to money damages. Any
 monetary award in such a case, however, might amount to nothing
 more than a transfer from the estate of one spouse to another, which
 160 Id. at 152-53, 202 S.E.2d at 507-08.
 I'l As to what constitutes "ordinary domestic services," see Galway v. Doody Steel Erecting
 Co., 103 Conn. 431, 130 A. 705 (1925); Lee v. Savannah Guano Co., 99 Ga. 572, 27 S.E. 159
 (1896); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Wilbanks, 60 Ga. App. 620, 4 S.E.2d 916 (1939).
 162 In recognizing such consideration, Williams anticipated in part the rationale of the
 California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr.
 815 (1976) (discussed at text accompanying notes 200-07 infra).
 IS See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 28, ? 1184. A court or legislature faced with this problem
 might, of course, decide to create an exception and to impose specific performance for family
 disputes.
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 might not make any economic sense if the family is viewed as an
 economic unit. This does not mean that a court should never order
 transfers from the estate of one spouse to the estate of another in
 recognition of a valid interspousal economic transaction.164 Never-
 theless, in many instances relief might amount to a transfer without
 economic substance.
 Even putting aside the problem of a remedy, what justifies the
 approach in Williams? Commentators advocating greater recogni-
 tion of intramarital contracts must suppose that judges would be
 useful arbiters of domestic disagreements.'85 Suggestions such as
 these have been backed with carefully considered arguments, but
 they all necessarily proceed from two assumptions: (1) greater free-
 dom for individuals to structure a marriage in ways that make sense
 to them is desirable, regardless of the state's interest, and (2) courts
 are appropriate forums for the resolution of disputes in such pri-
 vately ordered marital relationships. The first assumption necessar-
 ily suggests that the state's role in defining the status of such rela-
 tionships should be diminished, but the second necessarily implies
 that the state has a continuing right, or even duty, to exercise super-
 visory control over the relationship. The provisions enforced may be
 more of the couple's choosing, but the state will be present enforcing
 remedies during the course of the relationship rather than at its
 termination. In addition, the second assumption also reflects the
 lessened importance of societal institutions other than the state;
 court replaces family, community, church, or synagogue as the guid-
 ing institution.
 "I If the couple in Holsombeck v. Caldwell, 218 Ga. 393, 128 S.E.2d 47 (1962) (discussed
 at notes 151-53 supra and accompanying text), both had not been killed in an automobile
 accident, the wife might well have been entitled to an order requiring her husband to transfer
 the property he had promised her for her agreement to resume marital relations. If, on the
 other hand, she had reneged, the problem of a remedy would have become exacerbated. He
 could have interposed her breach as a defense to a suit by her seeking transfer of the property,
 but could he have tendered and sought damages? How would they have been measured? For
 a discussion of this point, see Towles v. Towles, 256 S.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 53 (1971).
 "5 See, e.g., Note, Marriage Contracts for Services, supra note 139, at 1189. The author
 stated:
 Of course, marriage contracts would not be wholly amenable to interpretation ac-
 cording to the same rules used for commercial contracts, but there does not appear to
 be a significant conceptual distinction between the state's rightful interest in promot-
 ing good faith in a business deal and its interest in promoting honesty and fairness in
 a marital agreement.
 Id. (footnote omitted). Another commentator has suggested that small fines might be used
 in lieu of traditional contractual remedies as a means for enforcing intramarital bargains. See
 Comment, supra note 137, at 44-46.
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 Another more compelling argument in favor of a greater use of
 contract in marriage is the notion that contract may help preserve
 marriage and the family, two institutions fundamentally important
 to the maintenance of stability in a democratic society. One writer
 has suggested that marriage itself is too easy and that the parties
 should go through a more formal bargaining process at the outset
 to be educated as to the seriousness of the undertaking." In this
 model, greater use of contract and individual bargaining would
 screen out those couples who are not serious or who discover that
 they are fundamentally at odds with each other on matters impor-
 tant to the ultimate stability of the marital pact.'67
 The idea that contract may serve to strengthen marriage as a form
 of family orientation is intriguing, but it is still untested and per-
 haps unprovable. A greater use of contract would not, however,
 remove the state from interference in the marital relation. Under
 the status construct now prevalent, the state superimposes the
 structure on the partners, but (except for problems relating to disso-
 lution, death, or desertion) the state allows, even requires, the par-
 ties to work out their own problems within the context of the mar-
 riage. This "hands-off' policy keeps the state from directly intrud-
 ing upon the private, day-to-day affairs of a couple.'68 The use of
 "I See Note, Marriage as Contract, supra note 139, at 643-44. Although parties should be
 made aware of the seriousness of marriage prior to embarking on the marital adventure, some
 of the other premises of this note are doubtful. The author is opposed categorically to the
 use of status concepts in a modern, pluralistic society, see id. at 635-36. The author also seems
 to be unfamiliar with Isaacs and other writers, see text accompanying notes 43-68 supra,
 because the piece bases its arguments on the more restrictive concept of status employed by
 Maine, see text accompanying notes 11-14 supra. The thesis that regulation of marriage by
 statutory law serves "no discernible public welfare function," Note, Marriage as Contract,
 supra note 139, at 621, also is questionable.
 I See Note, Marriage as Contract, supra note 139, at 643. Professor Fleischmann, in a
 similar vein, has made the argument that traditional marriage is in trouble, but contract may
 save it:
 The preservation of conventional marriage against such innovations as group mar-
 riage, successive marriages, or unsolemnized union is desirable. We have considerable
 societal experience in the problems of conventional marriage and their solution. A form
 so long accepted should not lightly be discarded. Thus, if the proposal of this article
 is thought questionable because of its novelty, it should be observed that this proposal
 offers a means to preserve through adaptation an institution which is in serious danger.
 Its approach is therefore fundamentally conservative.
 Fleischmann, supra note 143, at 49.
 For Maine, the status of persons in ancient society stemmed from the jurisdictional
 autonomy of the family: "[Tihe peculiarities of law in its most ancient state lead us irresist-
 ibly to the conclusion that it took precisely the same view of the family group which is taken
 of individual men by the systems of rights and duties now prevalent throughout Europe." H.
 MAINE, supra note 11, at 139. Thus domestic autonomy may rest on the withdrawal of state
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 enforceable contracts to organize the marital structure might pro-
 vide a couple initially with greater freedom in the ordering of their
 lives, but resolution of disputes necessarily will involve more direct
 interference by the state. The state will not be removed from the
 picture; it simply will intrude at a different point, and this intrusion
 could be more objectionable than intrusion by way of an ordering
 of status at the outset.'89 For the time being, however, a contractual
 model for marriage exists only in the periodicals and not in the
 cases.'70 The situation is considerably different for unmarried cou-
 ples.
 C. Long Term Cohabitation Without Marriage-
 Contract, Status, or Neither?
 Some men and women always have chosen to live with one an-
 other outside the traditional marital relationship. In the absence of
 the accepted forms and ceremonies of church or state, such couples
 usually have not been subjected to the status obligations of mar-
 riage even though they may have acted as if they were married and
 appeared so to the world at large."7'
 control over private disputes. The desire to have both domestic autonomy and state media-
 tion of disputes between members through enforcement of private contractual provisions
 might be described as "indulging in the great American dream of wishing to have their cake
 and eat it too." Clark, supra note 132, at 452 (speaking of the desire to have property rights
 imposed on unmarried, cohabitating couples).
 '"I For more on this point, see Clark, supra note 132, at 449-52. Fundamental to the whole
 problem is the appropriate role of the state. One may argue that the state has no business
 interfering with individual decisionmaking as to the form of a long term personal relationship,
 but if such relationships form the basis for societal order and organization, does not the state
 have a vital interest? Full consideration of these issues is beyond the intended scope of this
 article. For some interesting discussions of similar issues with respect to the state's interest
 in regulating pornography, see Berns, Pornography vs. Democracy: The Case for Censorship,
 PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1971, at 3; Frankel, The Moral Environment of the Law, 61 MINN. L.
 REV. 921 (1977); Gellhorn, Dirty Books, Disgusting Pictures and Dreadful Laws, 8 GA. L. REV.
 291 (1974); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
 Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974).
 I'll That many of the laws regulating marriage are archaic or oppressive to the female does
 not necessarily imply that adopting private contract as the governing construct for the mari-
 tal relation would be better. Social changes can result in political changes and more desirable
 statutes if widespread support for revision exists. We are not concerned here with archaic laws
 that disadvantage a minority. The state's attitude toward male-female relationships affects
 all of us.
 "'I This statement requires one qualification. In some states, if two people hold themselves
 out as a married couple for a certain period of time, the state will declare them to be married
 the same as if they had oberved the recognized forms. Such a "common-law marriage" is
 legally the same as a traditional marriage. The majority of American states do not, however,
 recognize common-law marriages, and even in those that do the couple must live together
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 Such unmarried couples may wish to provide for various divisions
 of responsibility, to divide property and income, to provide for chil-
 dren of the union, and to work out some equitable means for settling
 property upon a termination of the arrangement. In a traditional
 marriage, statutory law generally defines the means by which such
 matters are to be handled.172 In a nonmarital situation, usually no
 applicable statutory provisions exist, and attempts by the parties
 to order their affairs through the means of private contract have
 met with limited success. Courts have believed that living together
 outside the bonds of marriage implies that the partners are engaged
 in illicit sexual relations. This fact poisons any agreement within
 the context of the affair because if the consideration is sex, then, say
 the courts, the contract is essentially one for prostitution and not
 enforceable.'73 A contract between partners in an illicit sexual
 affair, however, may be enforceable if the subject matter of the
 contract and its consideration are severable from the sexual rela-
 tionship.'74 Thus couples who are partners in a legitimate business
 can enforce their business arrangements with each other even if
 they might also be having an affair.'75
 This general approach has created some significant problems not
 only for the parties directly involved but also for judges who try to
 administer the law in a reasonably equitable fashion. The cases
 usually have involved couples engaged in one of three different
 kinds of relationships that for short can be called the faithful mis-
 tress, the putative spouse, and the meretricious spouse. The first is
 not generally characterized by cohabitation as are the second and
 third. The putative spouse is usually regarded as "innocent" in that
 he or she has believed the marriage to be valid only to discover that
 for a significant period of time before the status attaches. For a general discussion of common-
 law marriage, see H. CLARK, supra note 131, at 45-58. Subsequent to the publication of that
 text, New Hampshire also enacted a statute providing for common-law marriage. See N.H.
 REV. STAT. ANN. ? 457:39 (1968). See also Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An
 Appraisal of Trends in Family Organization, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 88 (1960).
 17 See notes 131-70 supra and accompanying text.
 " Professor Corbin has stated this rationale quite bluntly:
 A promise is not enforceable if part or all of the consideration for it is illicit sexual
 intercourse or the continuance of such an illicit relationship. This is true even though
 the relationship is not adulterous or otherwise criminal; the bargain is contra bonos
 mores in any case and the parties are regarded as in pari delicto.
 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 28, ? 1476, at 621-22 (footnotes omitted).
 "I "A bargain between two persons is not made illegal by the mere fact of an illicit relation-
 ship between them, so long as that relationship constitutes no part of the consideration
 bargained for and no promise in the bargain is conditional upon it." Id. at 622 (footnotes
 omitted).
 1'1 See notes 210-15 infra and accompanying text.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 23 May 2017 02:33:38 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1078 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 64:1039
 the mate has been duplicitous or that some technical formality has
 not been fulfilled.'76
 The faithful mistress has fared least well. Almost a half-century
 ago, Professor Havighurst called for greater recognition of an im-
 plied agreement to pay for nonsexual services performed by a mis-
 tress for the benefit of her lover,'77 but apparently no court has
 allowed a woman to prevail on such a theory in the absence of actual
 cohabitation for a significant period of time. Lengthy cohabitation
 essentially transforms the position of the woman from that of a
 classic "mistress" to that of a putative or meretricious spouse.'78
 Nevertheless, some courts have been willing to afford the mistress
 an opportunity to try to prove an express agreement severable from
 the illicit affair. In a California case,'79 the plaintiff had been the
 mistress of a man who was determined not to get married. For
 fifteen years prior to his death she had acted variously as his host-
 ess, housekeeper, and nurse. Disappointed to learn that he had
 failed to remember her in his will, she brought an action against his
 executor seeking to collect a reasonable sum for the value of her
 housekeeping and nursing services.180 The court was not ready to
 countenance an implied contract, but it was willing to let her try to
 make out a case for an express agreement:
 In view, then, of the admitted meretricious relationship in this
 case, and that there can be no implied contract for services, plaintiff
 had the burden of showing (a) that there was an express agreement
 . . . and (b) that such agreement was not in contemplation of or
 dependent upon the illicit relationship."'
 Under this test, a woman who performed various tasks not required
 by law and normally performed for pay would not be prevented from
 recovery on an express agreement if she could prove that sex was not
 part of the consideration."82 Thus the court simply applied the sever-
 "6 For a general definition of "putative" spouse, see Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partner-
 ship: A Proposal for Dividing the Property of Unmarried Families, 12 WILLAMEmrm L.J. 453,
 460-62 (1976) (citing, inter alia, Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948);
 Smith v. Smith, 255 Wis. 96, 38 N.W.2d 12 (1949)).
 " See Havighurst, supra note 142, at 398.
 '8 The same would be true of a male lover, but the reported cases usually deal with a
 female suing the man.
 "I Lovinger v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, Cal. App. , 243 P.2d 561 (1952).
 164 Id. at , 243 P.2d at 564.
 181 Id. at , 243 P.2d at 569. Accord, Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal.
 Rptr. 604 (1975).
 182 The deceased male partner had the money, and the female had just provided her time,
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 ability doctrine outlined above.'83
 The difficulty in severing an express agreement from an illicit
 affair was made clear in the recent New Jersey case of Naimo v. La
 Fianza. 84 Elsa and Mario, a married man, began to have an affair
 in 1950. Mario and his wife had an adopted child, but he wanted to
 have a natural child and persuaded Elsa to bear him one. Elsa gave
 birth to Mario's son in 1964, and Mario acknowledged the child
 openly, supported him, gave him his name, and was by all accounts
 a doting father.'85 Some evidence existed that Mario had made an
 express promise to remember the child adequately in his will, but
 when Mario died suddenly in October 1975, the will had no provi-
 sion for his son. Elsa sued as a guardian ad litem for the child on
 the promise to make a will, but she lost because the court found that
 the contract was not severable from the adulterous affair:
 We cannot be unmindful of the fact that here one party was unmar-
 ried and the other was married. Despite our changing standards of
 morality, the family unit is an integral part of our society and must
 be preserved and maintained. We cannot countenance the relation-
 ship of a married man and his mistress or lover. The mere fact that
 one party desires to produce a child of his own, while a noble motive,
 does not justify the means to that end. Even though the act of
 adultery may be decriminalized by legislative enactment, public
 policy cannot tolerate illicit relationships of this kind and any agree-
 ments arising therefrom.'8
 care, and services. The woman's case might be stronger if she could show direct financial
 contributions from her separate estate.
 "I' See notes 174-75 supra and accompanying text. In Williams v. Bullington, 159 Fla. 618,
 32 So. 2d 273 (1947), the Florida Supreme Court applied a similar test to a case involving an
 alleged agreement with respect to a real estate transfer. The court held:
 If the land transaction had been in furtherance of or in consideration for the illicit
 relation there might be substance to this contention [that it was unenforceable]. It
 might likewise be true if legal precepts were required to parallel moral precepts, but
 that is not the case. The illicit relation was commenced years before the land contract
 was made, and had no connection with or dependence on it. One might recoil under
 the knowledge that another's home was paid for with the proceeds of bootleg liquor
 but there is no theory under the law that it could be confiscated for that reason.
 Id. at 622, 32 So. 2d at 275. For other cases grappling with this problem, see Karoley v. Reid,
 223 Ark. 737, 269 S.W.2d 322 (1954); Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 458, 247 P.2d 19
 (1952); Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954); Tyranski v. Piggins, 44
 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973).
 146 N.J. Super. 362, 369 A.2d 987 (Ch. Div. 1976). This case did not involve cohabita-
 tion.
 115 See id. at 365-67, 369 A.2d at 989-90.
 "' Id. at 370-71, 369 A.2d at 992.
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 For all the court's piety, not only Elsa but also her son, who was
 innocent of any wrongdoing, suffered the loss of a means of support.
 The child was not allowed to proceed on the theory that he was the
 third party beneficiary of the agreement between Mario and Elsa
 because the principal "contract" had been tainted with immorality.
 The sins but not the riches of the father were visited upon the son.
 Unlike the faithful mistress, the putative spouse usually has been
 treated as if she were a legitimate spouse,'87 although courts have
 had to resort to a variety of devices such as resulting trusts, implied
 partnerships, express or implied contracts to make a will, and ex-
 press or implied joint ventures to protect an innocent partner caught
 in an illegal union.'88 A decidedly moralistic tone runs throughout
 the decisions: the mistress has knowingly flaunted convention, but
 the putative spouse has been the victim of circumstance or deceit.
 More recent cases focus on the third kind of relationship-the
 couple who choose to cohabit essentially as husband and wife but
 without the benefit of the sanction of church or state. The tendency
 of some courts is to allow such couples to order their living arrange-
 ments by enforceable private contract. Other courts create a new
 status and treat such couples almost as if they were married, and
 still other courts continue to invoke the "meretricious spouse" rule'89
 and refuse to give the couple judicial assistance in their disputes,
 with results akin to those in cases involving the faithful mistress.
 'll See generally Folberg & Buren, supra note 176, at 460-62. Such has not always been the
 case. The "putative" spouse in Cropsey v. Sweeney, 27 Barb. 310 (N.Y. App. Div. 1858),
 certainly did not meet with much sympathy in the legal system. She had lived with James
 Ridgeway as his wife for 26 years after going through a formal wedding ceremony. She bore
 him 12 children. After Ridgeway died, she discovered that he had never been legally divorced
 from his first wife and that this "marriage" of 26 years had never been valid in the eyes of
 the law. She was not allowed to take as a spouse under the laws of intestate succession, and
 so she sought to recover the reasonable value of her services as manager of the couple's
 domestic affairs and as a helpmate to Ridgeway in the accumulation of his estate. She was
 unsuccessful because the court said no express or implied contractual arrangement could arise
 where the woman had thought herself properly married and performed the ordinary domestic
 duties of a wife with no expectation of pecuniary reward. The "widow" could not take from
 the estate because she was not a "widow," and she could not recover as an employee because
 she had considered herself to be a "wife" and did not intend that the performance of her
 "spousal" duties should be attended by legal consequences. See id. at 314-15. Compare id.
 with Shaw v. Shaw, [1954] 2 Q.B. 429 (C.A.) (similarly situated "widow" sued for breach
 of a promise to marry; court awarded her a widow's share reasoning that the "husband" had
 breached a continuing warranty that he was free to marry).
 ' For a general collection and discussion of the cases, see Bruch, Property Rights of De
 Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101
 (1976); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1255 (1953).
 I'l See generally Bruch, supra note 188, at 112-13.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 23 May 2017 02:33:38 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1978] Contract and Status 1081
 As in so many aspects of cultural change, California has led the
 way. California courts seemed initially disposed to protect the prop-
 erty rights of unmarried couples by imposing the community prop-
 erty rights of a married couple upon them. In re Marriage of Cary'90
 first reached this result when the court reasoned that the passage
 of a "no-fault" divorce statute"' signalled a legislative intent to
 remove considerations of "fault" from an assessment of an
 'unmarried living arrangement" with sufficient resemblance to a
 normal family.'92 In short, Cary shifted such couples "from the cate-
 gory of meretricious to the category of putative spouse,"'193 if they
 were engaged in an "ostensible marital . . . [and] actual family
 relationship."'94 Thus upon dissolution the relationship would be
 treated as a marriage for the purpose of allocating property. This
 approach amounted to a direct imposition of a status construct
 without regard to private agreement, express or implied.
 Cary has been subjected to harsh criticism both for its logic and
 for the utility of the remedy it devised. One commentator pointed
 out that it left open three vital and ultimately unanswerable ques-
 tions:'95 (1) What proof is necessary to show that the couple have an
 ''ostensible marital and actual family relationship"? Some couples
 who want to avoid the marital status might be caught in it and vice
 versa. (2) How much of the statutory law should be applied? If
 property is to be divided upon dissolution of the relationship as if
 the couple were married, then should the couple be treated in all
 respects as if married in connection with questions about workmen's
 compensation, death benefits, or homestead exemptions? (3) What
 if one of the partners to the meretricious relationship is legally mar-
 ried to a third party? This commentator went on to suggest that the
 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
 'I' California Family Law Act of 1969, CAL. CIV. CODE ?? 4000-5138 (West 1970).
 92 34 Cal. App. 3d at 351-52, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
 Comment, Property Rights upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin v.
 Marvin, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708, 1712 (1977) (footnote omitted). Clark pointed out that the
 effect of Cary, and those cases that followed it, "is to reinstitute common law marriage in
 California after it has been abolished by the legislature." Clark, supra note 132, at 449.
 94 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
 See Note, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation, 25 HASTINGS L.J.
 1226, 1227-29 (1974). One might also ask what should become of a meretricious "bigamist,"
 one who is not legally married to anyone but who manages to carry on an ostensible marital
 and actual family relationship with two partners. See also Note, In re Marriage of Cary:
 Equitable Rights Granted to the Meretricious Spouse, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 186 (1974). For earlier
 case history, see Note, Illicit Cohabitation: The Impact of the Vallera and Keene cases on
 the Rights of the Meretricious Spouse, 6 U.C.D.L. REV. 354 (1973).
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 court had created unnecessary difficulties by treating the relation-
 ship as one equivalent to the status of marriage. The same result
 could have been reached by using doctrines of trust or contract,
 which would have given each partner a fair share of the property and
 also would have recognized the separate legal identities of the par-
 ties.'96 In effect, the court created a status but did not define its
 parameters.
 In re Estate of Atherley197 amply demonstrates the theoretical and
 practical confusion inherent in Cary. Harold and Ruth were married
 in 1933, but in 1945 Harold met Annette and fell in love with her.
 He left Ruth for Annette in 1947 and lived with her, to all outward
 appearances as husband and wife, until his death intestate in 1969.
 In 1961, Harold obtained a divorce in Mexico from Ruth and
 "married" Annette in Las Vegas the next year. California did not
 recognize Mexican divorces, and Harold was never legally divorced
 from Ruth nor legally married to. Annette insofar as California was
 concerned.'98 The court applied Cary to give Annette a one-half
 interest in the property of her "marriage" to Harold but treated
 Ruth as the legitimate heir for purposes of intestate succession. This
 Solomon-like decision resulted in a sharing of the estate between
 Harold's two women and a limitation on the status of a Cary spouse.
 Had Cary been followed to its logical conclusion, Annette might well
 have been treated as the surviving spouse and taken the bulk of the
 estate,' but that also would have given de facto recognition to
 Mexican divorces, which would have been contrary to another long-
 standing California policy.
 Recently, the California Supreme Court changed the theoretical
 course of law in this area in the celebrated case of Marvin v.
 Marvin.200 Michelle and Lee Marvin began living together in Octo-
 ber 1964 and continued to do so until May 1970, when Lee asked
 her to leave the house they had been sharing, which was in his name.
 Lee continued to provide Michelle with a substantial monthly in-
 I'l See Note, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation, supra note 195, at
 1245-46. Cf. Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975) (different
 panel refused to follow Cary and employed meretricious spouse rule).
 97 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975).
 See id. at 764, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
 199 Had the court treated Annette like Harold's wife, she would have had a one-half interest
 in the property acquired during cohabitation and also would have taken a spouse's share
 according to the rules of intestate succession. See CAL. PROB. CODE ?? 221, 223 (West 1956).
 I'll 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). For a comprehensive discussion
 of this case, see Comment, supra note 193.
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 come until November 1971, when he terminated the payments.
 Michelle then initiated a lawsuit in which she sought an equal divi-
 sion of the property acquired during cohabitation, claiming that she
 had given up her movie career and had performed the usual domes-
 tic services of a housewife in return for Lee's oral promise to make
 such a division. Lee denied any liability and interposed the defense
 of a meretricious relationship: not only had they cohabited without
 being married, but for two of the years they lived together Lee was
 married to another woman.201 The trial court granted Lee's motion
 to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim for
 relief, but the California Supreme Court reversed and held that
 Michelle had set forth a prima facie case. The court's analysis was
 considerably different from that used by the court of appeals in
 either Cary or Atherley; Marvin decided that the Family Law Act
 did not apply to nonmarital relationships.202 The court reiter-
 ated the severability rule and ensured it a useful legal future by
 narrowly construing the meretricious spouse rule:
 In summary, we base our opinion on the principle that adults who
 voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are nonethe-
 less as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their
 earnings and property rights. . . . So long as the agreement does
 not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may
 order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes
 the courts from enforcing such agreements.203
 201 18 Cal. 3d at 668, 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
 2e Id. at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
 2N' Id. at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825. In reaching this decision, the court
 took express notice of fundamental changes in societal mores:
 [W]e believe that the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modern society and
 the social acceptance of them, marks this as a time when our courts should by no
 means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called meretricious relationship
 to the instant case. As we have explained, the nonenforceability of agreements ex-
 pressly providing for meretricious conduct rested upon the fact that such conduct, as
 the word suggests, pertained to and encompassed prostitution. To equate the nonmari-
 tal relationship of today to such a subject matter is to do violence to an accepted and
 wholly different practice.
 The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabitation
 that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have
 apparently been so widely abandoned by so many.
 Id. at 683-84, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. This court was adopting an approach
 that the late Wolfgang Friedmann suggested was appropriate and desirable for common-law
 judges:
 In his application of precedent, as in the interpretation of statutes, the judge must take
 note of major shifts in public opinion and social policy, of developments sufficiently
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 Thus unmarried couples may regulate all the economic incidents of
 their relationship by private agreement, so long as sexual practices
 form no apparent part of the consideration.
 The court further proclaimed its willingness to enforce contracts
 implied from the conduct of the parties and make available equita-
 ble remedies to de facto spouses.204 Justice Clark dissented from this
 portion of the opinion, fearing that the availability of equitable
 remedies amounted to the imposition of marital status on the par-
 ties:
 When the parties to a meretricious relationship show by express
 or implied in fact agreement they intend to create mutual obliga-
 tions, the courts should enforce the agreement. However, in the
 absence of agreement, we should stop and consider the ramifications
 before creating economic obligations which may violate legislative
 intent, contravene the intention of the parties, and surely generate
 undue burdens on our trial courts.
 By judicial overreach, the majority perform a nunc pro tunc mar-
 riage, dissolve it, and distribute its property on terms never contem-
 plated by the parties, case law or the Legislature.205
 Clark's concern would be valid if the court actually had been rein-
 troducing Cary by the backdoor. Not only would the judicially im-
 plied marriage be difficult to reconcile with the reality of Lee's
 legitimate marriage for the period up to January 1967, but it also
 would have created a status for the parties that neither apparently
 desired.
 Marvin, however, did not purport to apply Cary. The majority
 merely said that if the provision of sexual services was severable,
 then the agreement could be enforced as being founded upon valid
 consideration (domestic labor and the surrender of a career). This
 statement was altogether different from saying that because the two
 had cohabited for a time they should be treated as married for the
 purposes of property settlement upon dissolution of the arrange-
 fundamental to be accepted by the consensus of public opinion and to be expressed
 by the general trend in legislative policy. The theoretical formulation of such an ap-
 proach must always remain somewhat vague, for the ways in which changes in public
 opinion express themselves in a democratic society are many and it is not an easy task
 for a court to fix the borderline between accepted evolutions in public opinion, on the
 one hand, and personal philosophy or prejudice, on the other.
 W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 4, at 54.
 I'll See 18 Cal. 3d at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
 205 Id. at 686, 557 P.2d at 123-24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33 (Clark, J., concurring in part
 and dissenting in part).
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 ment. Marvin's importance lies in the court's willingness to use
 quasi-contractual theories to create an agreement from the context
 of the relationship. This approach is not a departure from the tradi-
 tional contractual model, but it does apply a contractual construct
 in a domestic situation where courts have been somewhat reluctant
 to tread.206 In effect, California has moved steadily from the mere-
 tricious spouse rule, which is status-oriented, to a contractual ap-
 proach.207
 201 As pointed out above, see notes 131-46 supra and accompanying text, courts historically
 have been hesitant about imposing theories of commercial law on a marital relationship. The
 same generally has been true of domestic services by family members, or even perhaps close
 friends, where a long and intimate relationship exists. Such services are, so courts say,
 performed for reasons of love and affection rather than for pecuniary reward. See generally
 Havighurst, supra note 142; McDowell, supra note 137.
 217 Oregon has proceeded in a similar manner, yet far more abruptly. The Supreme Court
 of Oregon, in Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976), simply wiped out the
 meretricious spouse rule:
 We conclude that we should abandon dubious legal distinctions to accomplish what
 this court has believed in the past to be a just result. We hold that an agreement such
 as that pleaded in this case, is not void as against public policy....
 The application of the principle that such a contract will not be enforced has often
 resulted in the male keeping the assets accumulated in the relationship and the female
 being deprived of what she jointly accumulated. Although the parties have been jointly
 accumulating property for 19 years, that would be the result in this case if the principle
 were applied. While not condoning the parties' conduct, such a result seems to be
 unduly harsh.
 Id. at 426-27, 547 P.2d at 146-47. The abandonment of the meretricious spouse rule in Oregon
 does not automatically mean that a spousal-like division of property upon the dissolution of
 an unmarried partnership will occur. Latham was a suit on an express contract, and the
 case did not focus on whether the relationship itself might give rise to an implied contract or
 to a status akin to that of marriage.
 Similarly, Michigan courts for some time have taken a jaundiced view of the meretricious
 spouse rule. The case of Burns v. Stevens, 236 Mich. 447, 210 N.W. 483 (1926), decided more
 than fifty years ago, stated:
 [Tihe rule that if the parties to a suit are in pari delicto a court of equity will leave
 them where they have placed themselves should not be here applied. . . The ques-
 tion to be determined in this case . . . is whether the party acquired an interest in
 the property or a security for the money advanced. The manner in which they were
 then living is immaterial to the issue except in its bearing upon the weight to be given
 to their testimony. The doors of courts are not closed to people who lead immoral lives
 when contracts between them untainted with illegality or fraud are involved.
 Id. at 452-53, 210 N.W. at 485.
 Burns provided the basis for the enforcement of a contract between the partners to a
 meretricious relationship in the much more recent case of Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App.
 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973). The male partner had died and the woman sought to enforce an
 alleged oral agreement by the decedent to convey a house. Despite some obvious evidentiary
 problems, clear evidence existed that the woman had contributed a substantial sum toward
 the purchase of the house. In reliance on Burns, the court did not have any trouble disposing
 of the argument that the deal could not be enforced because the parties had engaged in an
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 The state of Washington has faced similar problems but has
 followed a somewhat different tack. In Creasman v. Boyle,208 de-
 cided in 1948, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a partner
 in an illicit relationship had no community rights in property ac-
 quired during the period of cohabitation.209 Some twenty-four years
 later the same court stopped just short of overruling Creasman in
 In re Estate of Thornton.210 Lucy Antoine and Roy Thornton lived
 together from 1953 until his death in 1969. They had four children
 and lived as man and wife, but at all times Roy continued to be
 married to Theo Thornton, from whom he had separated in the early
 fifties. In addition to her normal domestic duties, Lucy also was
 actively engaged with Roy in the management of a thriving cattle
 business, and the evidence indicated that her work had significantly
 contributed to the profits of the business.211 Roy died testate, but his
 will named Theo as executrix and did not provide for Lucy. Lucy
 sued the estate as a creditor; she expressly avoided a direct attack
 on Creasman and did not seek to use the nature of her relationship
 with Roy as the basis for a claim of community property. Instead,
 she sought to prove the existence of an implied partnership or joint
 venture in the cattle business. The court stated the issue as
 whether the surviving member of a couple living in a meretricious
 relationship may prove the existence of a partnership or joint ven-
 ture agreement involving business property ostensibly or seemingly
 owned by the deceased partner, by showing the surrounding circum-
 stances and the acts of the couple, rather than by proving the exis-
 tence of an express contract of partnership.212
 The court answered its question affirmatively. The "meretricious
 spouse" rule did not apply because the "contract" was one related
 to a business operation and not one founded upon the illicit relation-
 ship.213 The case is noteworthy both for giving recognition to im-
 plied as well as express agreements and for applying the severability
 illicit affair. See id. at 575-77, 205 N.W.2d at 597-99. Tyranski recognized the punitive effect
 that strict application of the meretricious spouse rule might have. The court also noted that
 a number of judges had paid lip service to the rule while fashioning some exception so as to
 avoid rewarding one party and punishing the other. See id. at 577, 205 N.W.2d at 598-99.
 3'" 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
 -' See id. at 357-58, 196 P.2d at 841-42.
 210 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972), on remand, 14 Wash. App. 397, 541 P.2d 1243
 (1975).
 211 See id. at 74-75, 499 P.2d at 865.
 212 Id. at 75, 499 P.2d at 865.
 21:1 See id. at 81, 499 P.2d at 868.
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 rule to implied agreements."'
 After Thornton, the rule in Creasman still worked to prevent
 recovery of an interest akin to that of a spouse based on the nature
 of the relationship itself, but Thornton did provide a large exception
 to Creasman in that it recognized the validity of an implied business
 agreement as to ownership of property between the partners to a
 meretricious relationship. Couples in Washington were freed from
 the necessity of showing a separate express agreement and from the
 evidentiary problems inherent in trying to prove a trust.215 Indeed,
 the result in Thornton was not much different from that subse-
 quently reached by the California Supreme Court in Marvin.
 The Washington Supreme Court had another opportunity to over-
 rule Creasman in Latham v. Hennessey,2"' but it only further nar-
 rowed the precedent's impact. The court suggested a significant and
 new variation on the possible theories of recovery in similar situa-
 tions:
 214 The court, however, went beyond its holding and emphasized that it would be favorably
 disposed to overrule Creasman were the issue directly presented. See id. at 79, 499 P.2d at
 866-67.
 Lucy sought alternatively to recover on a theory of breach of contract to make a will in her
 favor. The court was willing to accept such a theory, but Lucy did not have the facts to
 substantiate this claim. The court remanded the case for a trial on the merits, see id. at 81,
 499 P.2d at 869, but Lucy was not very successful. After hearing all the evidence, the trial
 court determined that the relationship between Lucy and Roy in the cattle business was that
 of employer-employee, and therefore Lucy was not entitled to an interest in Roy's estate on
 the basis of an implied partnership, joint venture, or trust. This decision was affirmed by the
 Washington Court of Appeals. See In re Estate of Thornton, 14 Wash. App. 397, 541 P.2d
 1243 (1975).
 215 To prove a constructive trust the plaintiff must make some showing of "fraud, over-
 reaching or inequitable conduct." A resulting trust requires proof that one party intended to
 hold property in trust for another who furnished the consideration. Both require a "clear,
 cogent, and convincing standard of proof." Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 390-91, 523
 P.2d 957, 960 (1974). That case involved litigation between former Israeli citizens who were
 divorced in 1959. They emigrated to New York and entered into "sham" marriages to facili-
 tate the naturalization process, but at all times they lived as man and wife. The male partner
 went off to Washington to make his fortune and sometime later his "wife" joined him, but
 they permanently broke up in 1969. The evidence indicated that the woman had worked
 during most of the time they had been in the United States and had been, to a great extent,
 the financial supporter of the relationship. See id. at 388, 523 P.2d at 959. She sought a
 community property interest in the property acquired during cohabitation in Washington.
 Because they technically had been living in a meretricious relationship, Creasman prevented
 direct application of community property rules, but the court reached essentially the same
 result by applying a constructive trust. In reaching this decision, the court noted that the
 couple had never intended to be divorced. The whole divorce-remarriage process was meant
 to be a fraud for purposes of getting through naturalization, and therefore the court was
 somewhat reluctant to give the "husband" the benefit of the meretricious spouse rule. See
 id. at 393, 523 P.2d at 961.
 216 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976) (en banc).
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 There also appears to be a viable alternative approach to the
 Creasman presumption and its exceptions. A court could ascertain
 whether there exists a long-term, stable, nonmarital family relation-
 ship. Such relevant factors include continuous cohabitation, dura-
 tion of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, and the pooling
 of resources and services for joint projects. If a relationship exists,
 it is reasonable to assume that each member in some way contrib-
 uted to the acquisition of the property. A court could then examine
 the relationship and the property accumulations and make a just
 and equitable disposition of the property. Also, if warranted by the
 facts of a particular case, the court could apply the community
 property laws by analogy to determine the rights of the parties.217
 This statement was dictum and therefore has no actual preceden-
 tial value, but the opinion was unanimous and en banc. Thus a
 direct attack on Creasman probably would meet with general ap-
 proval. In the meantime, Latham significantly narrows the impact
 of Creasman and suggests a relational construct that is a de facto
 status. If a Washington court finds a particular relationship to meet
 certain standards of seriousness and intimacy, it may impose a
 marital-like status for the division of property interests as between
 the partners.218 Thus while California moves resolutely from imply-
 ing the status of a de facto marriage to resting on more purely
 contractual theories, Washington appears to be sliding in the other
 direction.
 Minnesota courts seem to wish to split the difference between the
 status and contract approaches. In Carlson v. Olson,219 the couple
 never married but held themselves out as man and wife for twenty-
 one years. They raised a son to majority, acquired a home and the
 usual possessions of a middle-class couple, and he worked and sup-
 ported the family while she acted as a housewife.220 They eventually
 parted and the woman brought an action to partition the property
 of the union. Minnesota does not recognize common-law marriage,
 but the court allowed an even division of the property "on the theory
 that the parties had an agreement to share their accumulations, and
 that the contributions of each was [sic] an irrevocable gift to the
 other of one-half of the assets placed in joint tenancy and of the
 2" Id. at 554, 554 P.2d at 1059 (dictum).
 21- This raises some of the same problems as those suggested by In re Cary, 34 Cal. App.
 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973). See notes 190-96 supra and accompanying text.
 21 9_ Minn. , 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977).
 22l See id. at , 256 N.W.2d at 250.
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 household and other personal property as well."22' The trial court
 had reviewed all the particulars of the relationship and had deter-
 mined that the manner in which the parties had lived was so closely
 akin to marriage that an inference of an agreement for a division of
 property was justifiable. In reliance on the rationale of Marvin, the
 supreme court affirmed the approach of the trial court.222
 Other courts recently faced with the plight of the meretricious
 spouse have refused to imply a legal status or to enforce a private
 agreement. In Davis v. Misiano,223 the Supreme Judicial Court of
 Massachusetts refused to impose a general duty of support arising
 from the termination of a meretricious relationship, despite the pa-
 thetic circumstances of the female plaintiff.224 The court stated:
 In view of the extensive involvement of the Legislature in providing
 for awards of separate support and alimony to married persons, we
 decline at this time to extend such payments to those who have
 cohabited without a formal marriage in the absence of an appropri-
 ate legislative enactment. In so far as the complaint sought to com-
 pel the defendant to provide generalized financial support for the
 plaintiff, we hold that it was properly dismissed.225
 The court, however, carefully refrained from deciding whether par-
 ties to a nonmarital relationship could enforce express or implied
 contracts between themselves as to the distribution of property.22"
 The meretricious spouse rule has not fallen into total desuetude
 even with respect to express agreements. The Georgia Supreme
 Court strictly applied the rule in Rehak v. Mathis.227 Hazel Rehak
 and Archie Mathis lived together for eighteen years essentially as
 man and wife, but they never held themselves out to be married.
 When they separated in 1975, Hazel was surprised to learn that the
 221 Id. (syllabus by the court).
 222 See id. at , 256 N.W.2d at 255.
 22:3 __ Mass. , 366 N.E.2d 752 (1977).
 224 In July 1975, Louis Misiano moved in with Gale Davis and lived with her until May 28,
 1976, when he left to return to his wife and family in another state. Gale was several months
 pregnant when Louis walked out, and she brought an action in the probate court seeking
 general support for herself plus prenatal costs and child support for the child that Louis
 fathered. Her lawyer raised the issue of paternity in the wrong court because the probate court
 was without jurisdiction to determine paternity. Jurisdiction was proper as to the claim for
 general support, but Gale's request was denied. See id. at , 366 N.E.2d at 753.
 121 Id. at __, 366 N.E.2d at 754 (footnote omitted). In a companion case, the court ruled
 that the baby had no separate cause of action for support but that such a claim inhered in
 the mother. See Baby X v. Misiano, Mass. __, 366 N.E.2d 755 (1977).
 226 See __ Mass. at , 366 N.E.2d at 754 n.l.
 227 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977).
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 house in which they had lived was in Archie's name alone, even
 though Archie apparently had led her to believe that they owned it
 jointly. Hazel filed an action in equity alleging that she and Archie
 jointly had purchased the house in 1957, that she had made all the
 mortgage payments for 1957 and 1958, and that from 1959 through
 February 1975 she had contributed one-half of each monthly pay-
 ment. She sought payments of $100 a month for the provision of
 housekeeping services over eighteen years and title to the house.228
 The trial court granted summary judgment for Archie and the su-
 preme court affirmed. The parties admittedly had cohabited; there-
 fore, the law presumed an illicit sexual relationship; therefore, this
 sexual relationship must have formed part of the consideration, and
 the court would not entertain an action in equity to enforce a con-
 tract between the two.229 The court stated that Hazel had to rebut
 the presumption that illicit sex formed part of the consideration and
 that she had not proffered any evidence in rebuttal.230 Although the
 majority did recognize the severability rule, they certainly inter-
 preted its applicability narrowly.23'
 These cases reveal much about the use of contract or status in the
 ordering of long term intimate relationships.232 Comparison leads to
 the conclusion that contract is playing an increasingly important
 role, but the applicability of contractual theory is determined in
 I'l See id. at 543, 238 S.E.2d at 82.
 229 Id.
 230 Id.
 231 Justice Hill wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justice Hall joined:
 In the case before us, the movant has not carried the burden on a movant for
 summary judgment of showing that sex was any part of the consideration of this
 alleged contract. This court has simply presumed that sex was agreed to. We will not
 guess at the terms of contracts in other cases but here we knowingly imagine what
 the terms of this agreement were. In my opinion we should not use conjecture to
 imagine what the parties agreed to do.
 Let the defendant state under oath what he says was agreed to and what he says
 was done and if the contract be illegal let the district attorney represent the state. This
 court should not deny relief to the plaintiff based on our inference as to what consti-
 tuted the consideration for the alleged agreement sued on here.
 Id. at 544-45, 238 S.E.2d at 83 (Hill, J., dissenting).
 2:2 Taken together these various cases have one common theme apart from their relevance
 for status and contract: judges in the latter part of the twentieth century are willing to be
 somewhat less strict in the application of moral judgments. That, however, is merely a
 judicial reflection of general societal attitudes. Couples who live together without marriage
 simply are not subjected to the social disapprobation formerly attending such arrange-
 ments. The frequency of such unions and their gradual social acceptance are reflected in the
 willingness of courts to fashion exceptions to the meretricious spouse rule or to do away
 with it altogether. The strength of traditional values is evident, however, in decisions such
 as Rehak v. Mathis and Davis v. Misiano.
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 large part by the status of the parties in terms of their legal and
 traditional obligations toward one another. Neither the meretricious
 spouse nor the legitimate spouse can contract with their partner
 because of their legal status. Courts that strictly apply the meretri-
 cious spouse rule prevent the plaintiff from asserting any binding
 agreement because they presume that any such contract is tainted
 by the illicit sexuality at the core of the relationship. More modern
 courts liberate such parties legally from the status of immorality,
 giving them the ability to contract, and retain "meretriciousness"
 only as a contractual principle invalidating the recognition of sexual
 services as consideration. Moreover, these courts may infer an
 agreement for a sharing of property, but it is inferred for the reason
 that the recalcitrant partner, unlike a spouse, is under no preexist-
 ing duty to share the property.
 Courts are more likely to enforce agreements between unmarried
 couples when they need not pass any moral judgment on the affair.
 The doctrine of severability itself provides a ground for judges to
 avoid condoning the conduct of the couple. In Williams v.
 Bullington,233 the Florida Supreme Court was willing to enforce a
 real estate transaction between a man and a woman having an illicit
 affair. The court reasoned that an express contract of a typically
 commercial nature should be enforceable regardless of the legiti-
 macy of the parties' relationships in other areas. Williams involved
 an express agreement that "had no connection with or dependence
 on"234 the illicit relationship. This case was a straightforward appli-
 cation of the long-recognized severability rule.235 By way of com-
 parison, the evidence in Naimo v. La Fianza231 supported the con-
 tention that an express agreement to make a will had occurred, but
 the New Jersey court could not sever this agreement from the adul-
 terous affair between the principals because sexual services were the
 explicit consideration. The beneficiary of the alleged agreement
 was, in fact, the product of the affair itself.237 In dealing with a
 situation like the one in Williams, a court is not required to make
 any moral judgments; it is simply called upon to enforce an ordinary
 contract. Naimo made the moral issue unavoidable, although the
 233 159 Fla. 618, 32 So. 2d 273 (1947) (discussed at note 183 supra).
 t'4 Id. at 622, 32 So. 2d at 275.
 23s See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
 23f 146 N.J. Super. 362, 369 A.2d 987 (Ch. Div. 1976) (discussed at notes 184-86 supra and
 accompanying text).
 2:17 See notes 184-86 supra and accompanying text.
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 unavoidability of the issue did not compel the result.
 Where no express agreement appears, the courts have had more
 difficulty. In a case such as Williams, the only real question is
 whether the transaction at issue is severable from the meretricious
 aspects of the relationship. In the absence of an express agreement,
 the court necessarily must examine the nature of the relationship
 to determine whether or not an agreement may be implied from the
 factual context and then must apply the severability test to decide
 whether the implied agreement is enforceable. If a state has a pre-
 sumption, as does Georgia,238 that illicit sex is part of the consider-
 ation, the plaintiff is confronted with a significant problem of bur-
 den of proof, and severability may not be available as a practical
 matter. The application of quasi-contractual theories allowing re-
 covery on implied contracts and the creation of relational rights
 akin to those of a marital status, therefore, have marked the most
 fundamental shifts in judicial approach to transactions between
 unmarried couples.
 For example, Marvin v. Marvin239 suggests that one party might
 recover for domestic services just as if that partner had provided the
 services to an employer. The plaintiff in Marvin did allege that she
 had also given up a promising career to her detriment.240 Whether
 the provision of domestic services alone would have been enough is
 not clear, but the court's language seems to support an argument
 that recovery would be appropriate in such a case. This type of case
 should be distinguished from a situation like the one in In re Estate
 of Thornton,24' where the litigation centered around interests in a
 thriving cattle business and the question was whether a contract of
 partnership could be implied in a clearly commercial context. To
 allow recovery for domestic services on a theory of quantum meruit
 in the context of a meretricious affair is to give partners to such an
 affair a somewhat different, and perhaps more desirable, status
 than that given to married couples. Normally, quantum meruit is
 238 See Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977); text accompanying notes 227-
 31 supra.
 23 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (discussed at notes 200-07 supra
 and accompanying text).
 240 See text accompanying notes 200-01 supra. In Department of Human Resources v.
 Williams, 130 Ga. App. 149, 202 S.E.2d 402 (1973) (discussed at notes 158-67 supra and
 accompanying text), the Georgia Court of Appeals recognized the possibility that the surren-
 der of a career might be good consideration for a contract within the context of the marital
 union itself. See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
 241 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972) (discussed at notes 210-15 supra and accompanying
 text).
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 only available where payment is generally to be expected.242 In a
 domestic or family situation, most people do not generally expect
 that parties will be paid for doing the ordinary chores of life. Per-
 haps they should be entitled to payment, but, so courts reason, such
 duties usually are undertaken for reasons of love, affection, and
 mutual support or because they are imposed by law.243 Allowing a
 quasi-contractual recovery for the monetary value of such services
 implies a commercialization of the relationship, or a recognition
 that the services are beyond the ordinary call of duty, or a recogni-
 tion of a status somewhat the same as that of a spouse who, upon
 separation or death, would be entitled to community property, ali-
 mony, or a share of the estate. Any one of these possibilities involves
 some considerations of status. If the parties are to be treated in a
 commercial manner, that necessarily reflects on the perceived form
 of the relationship and transforms it into one governed by master-
 servant limitations rather than by domestic or familial consider-
 ations. On the other hand, treating such services as beyond the
 ordinary call of duty suggests that a duty exists that derives from
 the relationship.
 The decision in In re Marriage of Cary244 and the dicta in Latham
 v. Hennessey245 go somewhat further and actually impose a status
 construct on the parties to certain meretricious relationships. As the
 criticism of Cary indicates,246 this approach can lead to some trou-
 blesome problems. If a state rejects common-law marriages, then
 judicial recognition of a relationship giving rise to marital-like obli-
 gations may amount to an inconsistent de facto recognition of a
 common-law marriage. Cary has, apparently, been abandoned sub-
 sequently by Marvin, but the willingness of Marvin to consider the
 entire context of a relationship to determine whether or not a con-
 2"2 This rule is a reflection of the general theory that agreements will not be enforced absent
 some compelling state policy when the parties do not intend for their actions to be attended
 by legal consequences. Compare Sheldon v. Thornburg, 153 Iowa 622, 133 N.W. 1076 (1912),
 with Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465 (1857). See generally Havighurst, supra note 142, at
 390; McDowell, supra note 137. For a fascinating case, see Upton-on-Severn Rural Dist.
 Council v. Powell, [19421 1 All E.R. 220 (C.A.). For a collection of cases, see F. KESSLER &
 G. GILMORE, supra note 120, at 120, 129, 140.
 2"3 For a general discussion of policy reasons for refusing to allow recovery for domestic
 services and the difficulties in monitoring household services, see Bruch, supra note 188, at
 110-14; Havighurst, supra note 142; Note, Marriage Contracts for Services, supra note 139.
 244 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973) (discussed at notes 190-99 supra and
 accompanying text).
 24" 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976) (en banc) (discussed at notes 216-18 supra and
 accompanying text).
 246 See text accompanying notes 195-96 supra.
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 tract should be implied could lead the California courts to the devel-
 opment of a test akin to the "relational" one suggested by the Wash-
 ington court in Latham.
 Largely from a perceived need to do justice, courts have been
 willing to ignore traditional moral impediments to the enforcement
 of obligations between parties to a particular kind of relationship.
 In practical effect, this willingness could mean that meretricious
 partners might be able to organize the economic aspects of their
 relationship with greater flexibility than married couples. None of
 these cases directly addresses this problem, but what if an unmar-
 ried couple in a state with community property rules expressly con-
 tract for a division of property acquired during cohabitation that
 significantly differs from the division compelled by law for married
 couples. Should such a contract be enforced? If they have a
 "relationship" that is almost the same as "marriage," then should
 they be freed from the limitations placed on married couples? Three
 alternatives could be used to treat this problem: (1) treat married
 and unmarried couples differently, (2) use a "relationship" test to
 create a "status" for unmarried couples that is as much like the
 status of marriage as possible, or (3) allow greater individual free-
 dom to married couples to structure their relationships independent
 of state guidelines.
 The cases so far have adopted either the first or the second ap-
 proach. Either the strict application of the meretricious spouse rule
 or the enforcement of contracts between unmarried couples results
 in different treatment for those who are not married as compared
 with those who are married. In the first instance, moral condemna-
 tion by courts of the life-style of unmarried partners makes it more
 difficult for them to create enforceable agreements even with re-
 spect to simple matters, resulting in injustice to one of the parties.
 On the other hand, the enforcement of agreements generally be-
 tween unmarried partners may well give them greater flexibility
 than the state accords to married partners. Whatever the result, the
 treatment is essentially different, and the reason for the difference
 derives from the legitimacy of the union.
 In trying to be fair, some courts have created a marital-like status
 where none exists. This method may be adequate to deal with one
 case or another, but it has shortcomings as an overall approach, not
 the least of which is that two people who choose to live together
 without marriage often may be seeking to avoid the status obliga-
 tions of marriage itself. Furthermore, is the status to attach in all
 particulars? When does it attach? How is this approach to be recon-
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 23 May 2017 02:33:38 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1978] Contract and Status 1095
 ciled with a legislative policy against the recognition of "common-
 law marriages" in states that do not recognize such marriages? Must
 such a couple go through divorce proceedings to terminate their
 affair? That leaves the third alternative-loosening the structures
 of the marital status. This alternative has received much critical
 comment and has been suggested as the best and fairest way not
 only to reconcile differences in treatment between married and
 unmarried couples but also to improve the quality of the marital
 relationship itself.247 To date, the courts have not followed the com-
 mentators, and marriage is still a status in which contract and
 quasi-contract play a very limited role.
 Yet marriage as a status has at least one significant advantage
 that outweighs the greater freedom unmarried couples have in or-
 dering their affairs. As noted above,248 the enforcement of an express
 or implied contract necessarily involves the state in interpreting and
 rearranging the relationship between the parties. The nature of the
 services each has provided must be identified, proven, and evalu-
 ated; such consideration must be then severed from any conjugal
 services. Contractual disputes invite the state to inspect all relevant
 details of the relationship and determine who has breached.249
 Under modern marriage and divorce laws, married couples need not
 undergo this scrutiny. Property divisions follow objective standards
 and divorce may be obtained without investigation of fault. Dis-
 putes within the marriage, except where they violate the law, are
 properly left for resolution to the nonlegal forces of love and informal
 community mediation. By accepting the status approved by the
 state, the married couple shield themselves from state inspection.
 Once again, Friedmann's thesis250 requires some qualification.
 Treating unmarried cohabitation as a contractual arrangement and
 marriage as the acceptance of a status generally seems to comport
 with the intentions of the various parties. To impose a marital sta-
 tus on an unmarried couple, as in Cary, can both embroil the parties
 in the very obligations they sought to avoid and render legally
 meaningless the differences between marriage and "living to-
 gether." Neither life-style will disappear; both have their costs and
 benefits. Treating marriage as status and cohabitation as contract
 247 See notes 147-48 supra and accompanying text.
 24" See notes 165-69 supra and accompanying text.
 OI of course, in some states unmarried couples probably would not have much success in
 seeking judicial enforcement of their agreements anyway.
 2-', See text accompanying notes 57-67 supra.
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 can legally preserve those elements of each relationship that led a
 couple to adopt either form of relationship.25' But in considering
 disputes between unmarried couples, courts should be careful not
 to fashion rules that unfairly advantage such couples as compared
 to couples who have complied with social and legal norms and ac-
 tually have married each other. Indeed, status is not the sole means
 to achieving freedom in domestic relations. In this context,
 "liberty" means letting the parties choose between status and con-
 tract.252
 IV. CONCLUSION
 Friedmann defined status as "a useful description of legal condi-
 tions imposed upon the individual by public law."253 This article has
 inquired into the conditions status places upon the individual's free-
 dom to contract. Status does limit that freedom: the racist, after
 Runyon v. McCrary,254 the meretricious spouse, traditionally, and
 the legitimate spouse, indefinitely, all have had significant borders
 placed around their ability to contract.
 As the expression of public policy, status enforces community
 norms. Runyon proclaims social disapproval both of discrimination
 that confines the economic and educational opportunities of minori-
 ties and of allowing irrational prejudices to skew economic decision-
 making.255 On the other hand, the decline of the disabling status of
 the "meretricious spouse" mirrors the recession of social disap-
 proval of long term, unmarried cohabitation. Like the feudal serf or
 lord, one's estimation of these enforced norms will vary according
 to one's perspective. The status limitations attached to married
 couples are more problematic. Archaic laws make contract appeal-
 ing to some as a means for allowing individuals greater freedom to
 order their own affairs, but traditional marriage as a social institu-
 tion endures.
 Maine theorized that an increase in contractual freedom was con-
 2"I In a sense, this is what Folberg and Buren have suggested in their argument for the
 recognition of a "domestic partnership." See Folberg & Buren, supra note 176, at 479-85.
 252 Such a notion does not mean the state cannot create the status. Rehbinder felt that
 private choice was not inconsistent with publicly defined status. See pp. 1049-50 supra.
 '251 Text accompanying note 46 supra.
 25l 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
 2'. Runyon is also an example of modern American "common law" in the sense of judicial
 interpretation and modification of general statutory pronouncements. See note 3 supra.
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 ducive to general individual liberty. Friedmann claimed that this
 statement might be true for the family but that the government
 imposed status in other areas as a tool of liberation in the modern
 industrial state. This review of two areas of contemporary law has
 shown the elements of truth in each hypothesis, as they demonstrate
 the dynamic interplay between contract and status in modern
 law.256 The state imposes a status on the white racist so blacks may
 participate more readily in the marketplace. The goal is enhanced
 contractual freedom, the means are a limitation on that same free-
 dom at a different point. In the area of domestic relations, courts
 are cautiously expanding the ability of unmarried couples to arrange
 their economic affairs. But the greater judicial oversight of intra-
 household disputes necessitated by these contractual relations sug-
 gests that the status of marriage too can confer on an intimate union
 a freedom from outside interference.
 Status and contract do not denote ideal forms that persist beyond
 specific laws. They are descriptive terms the use of which can be
 justified only by the increased clarity they offer jurisprudential
 thinking; one must not be insensitive to the implications of the legal
 construct employed to resolve social dilemmas. Drawing lines be-
 tween contract and status forces us to examine the nature of the
 private interest and the justifications for and rationality of the pub-
 lic interest. For so long as our society values both the individual and
 the commonweal, contract and status will endure in a shifting, crea-
 tive dialectic.
 25fl See note 68 supra.
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